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Problems with Rules
Cass R. Sunsteint
Many of the most difficult issues in law involve the choice between
rules and rulelessness in cases where both seem unacceptable. The princi-
pal goal of this Article is to point the way toward a more refined under-
standing of the  ideal of the  rule of law,  one  that  sees  a  degree  of
particularity,  and a degree of law-making at the point of application, as
important parts of that ideal. The Article defends a  form of casuistry and
describes the potentially democratic  foundations of the casuistical enter-
prise in law. It begins by describing  the distinctive advantages of  rules and
law via rules, especially as a means for providing a consensus on what the
law is from people who disagree on  much else.  It also discusses three
attacks on decisions according  to rules:  the view that rules are excessively
conservative; the view that controversial  political and moral claims always
play a role in the interpretation  of rules, and thus that rules are not what
they appear  to be; and the view that rules are obtuse because they are too
crude to cover diverse human affairs, and because  judges should not decide
cases without closely inspecting the details of disputes.  The Article sug-
gests several ways to avoid the dilemmas posed by rules and rulelessness:
(a) a presumption in favor of  privately adaptable rules, that is, rules that
allocate entitlements without specifying outcomes, in an effort to promote
goals associated  with free markets; (b)  a recognition  of  legitimate rule revi-
sion, in which public officials and  private citizens are allowed to soften the
hard  edges of  rules; and (c) highly contextualized assessments of  the virtues
Copyright  © 1994 California Law Review,  Inc.
t  Karl  N.  Llewellyn  Distinguished  Service  Professor  of  Jurisprudence,  Law  School  and
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and  pathologies of  both options, in an effort to promote democratic  goals of
responsiveness and open participation.
[T]he highest ethical life of the mind consists at all times in the
breaking  of rules which have grown too narrow for the actual  case.
-William  James'
[T]he establishment  of broadly applicable general principles is
an  essential component  of the judicial process  ....
-Justice  Antonin  Scalia2
One  other  capital imperfection  [of Common Law  is]  ...  the
unaccommodatingness  of its  rules....  Hence the hardness of heart
which is a sort of endemical disease of lawyers  ....  Mischief being
almost their incessant  occupation,  and the greatest merits they  can
attain  being the  firmness  with which they persevere  in the task of
doing partial evil for the sake of that universal good which consists
in steady adherence  to established rules, a judge thus circumstanced
is obliged to divert himself of that anxious  sensibility, which is one
of the most useful as well as amiable  qualities  of the legislator.
-Jeremy  Bentham
3
INTRODUCTION
There are two stylized conceptions  of legal judgment.  The first, asso-
ciated with Jeremy Bentham4 and more recently with Justices Hugo Black-
and Antonin Scalia,6 places a high premium on the creation and application
of general  rules.  On this view, public  authorities  should avoid "balancing
tests" or  close attention to individual  circumstances.  They  should attempt
instead  to  give  guidance  to  lower  courts,  future  legislators,  and  citizens
through clear, abstract rules laid down in advance of actual applications.
The second conception,  associated with William Blackstone  and more
recently with Justices Felix Frankfurter7  and John Marshall  Harlan,8 places
a high premium on law-making at the point of application  through case-by-
case  decisions,  narrowly  tailored  to  the particulars  of individual  circum-
I.  GEORGE  AINSLIE,  PICOECONOMics  218  (1992)  (citing  WILLIAM  JAMES,  PRINCIPLES  OF
PSYCHOLOGY  209  (1890)).
2.  Justice  Antonin  Scalia,  The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.  CH.  L. Rzv.  1175,  1185
(1989).
3.  JEREMY BENTHAM,  OF  LAWS IN  GNRA.,  ch. XV,  12 n.1  (H.L.A.  Hart  ed.,  1970).
4.  See GERALD J. POSTEMA,  BENTHAM  AND  THE COMMON  LAW TRADmON 403-13 (1986),  which
shows,  however, that  Bentham's views  on  rules are quite  complex.
5.  See  Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube  Co.  v. Sawyer,  343  U.S.  579,  585-89  (1952)  (the  "Steel
Seizure  Case").
6.  See generally Scalia, supra note 2.
7.  See Youngstown, 343  U.S. at 594 (Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring).
8. See Poe v. Ullman,  367 U.S. 497,  525  (1961)  (Harlan,  J.,  dissenting).
[Vol.  83:953PROBLEMS WITH RULES
stances.  On this view, public  authorities should stay close to the details  of
the controversy  before them and avoid broader principles  altogether.  The
problem with broad principles is that they tend to overreach;  they may be
erroneous  or unreasonable  as applied to cases  not before the court.9
It  would  be  hard  to  overstate  the  importance  of  the  controversy
between  the two  views.  The  controversy arises  in every  area  of law;1 0  it
often  involves  fundamental liberties. 1  Of course, familiar understandings
of the rule of law prize, as a safeguard of freedom, broad rules laid down in
advance;  but the American  legal system  also values  close attention  to the
details of each case.  In every area of regulation-the environment, occupa-
tional safety and health, energy policy, communications,  control of monop-
oly power-it is necessary  to  choose between  general rules  and  case-by-
case decisions.
In  its  purest  form,  enthusiasm  for  genuinely  case-specific  decisions
makes no  sense.  Few if any judgments  about particular  cases  are entirely
particular.  Almost any judgment about a particular case depends on the use
of principles or reasons.  Any principles or reasons are, by their very nature,
broader than the case for which they are designed.  Case-by-case particular-
ism is not a promising foundation for law.
In many circumstances, however, enthusiasm for rules seems senseless
too.  Sometimes public authorities cannot design general rules, because they
lack  relevant  information.  Sometimes  general rules  will fail,  because the
legal  system  seeks  subtle judgments  about  a  range  of particulars.  Often
general rules  will  be poorly  suited to the new circumstances  that will be
turned up by unanticipated developments;  often rulemakers  cannot foresee
the circumstances to which their rules will be applied.  Often rules will be
too crude, since they run up against intransigent beliefs about how particu-
lar cases  should be resolved.
One of my principal goals in this Article  is to respond to  a pervasive
social phenomenon:  extravagant  enthusiasm for rules and an extravagantly
rule-bound  conception of the rule of law. 2  Case-by-case  decisions  are an
important part of legal justice.  We are familiar with a conception of proce-
dural fairness based on rules.  In this conception,  people have a right to be
told about  prevailing requirements  and a  correlative  right to test whether
those requirements  have been violated.  But there is another, more particu-
9.  The point is treated prominently in Board of Education v. Grumet, 114 S.  Ct. 2481, 2498-99
(1994)  (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
10.  See infra App. accompanying  notes  284-323.
11.  For  example,  see  the  attack  on the undue  burden  standard  as unacceptably  open-ended  in
Planned  Parenthood v.  Casey,  112  S.  Ct.  2791,  2876-80  (1992)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and
dissenting  in part).
12.  As examples of such  enthusiasm, see  F.A.  HAYEK,  THE  CONSTITUrrON  OF  LmERTv  148-61
(1960);  F.A.  HAYEK,  THE  RoAD  TO  SERoM  72-87  (1944);  Scalia, supra note 2.  Justice  Scalia's
approach  is not unqualified.  Id. at 1177.  For an attack  on extravagant enthusiasm for rules,  overlaping
with what I suggest here,  see generally KENNET  C. DAVIS  ET  AL.,  DISCRETIONARY  JUSTICE  IN EUROPE
AND  AMERICA  (1976).
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laristic conception of procedural fairness, one that is also worthy of respect.
Under that conception,  people are entitled to argue that they are relevantly
different  from  those that  have  come  before,  and that  when  their  case  is
investigated in all its particularity, it will be shown that special treatment  is
warranted.  On this view-with  potentially democratic  foundations-peo-
ple who are affected by rules should be allowed to participate in the creation
of the very rule to be  applied to their case.13
I argue here that the disadvantages  of rules and rule-bound justice are
often  insufficiently  appreciated,  and  that legal systems  sometimes  do and
should  abandon  rules  in favor  of a  form  of casuistry.  4  In the  casuistic
enterprise, judgments  are based not on a preexisting  rule, but on compari-
sons  between  the case  at hand  and  other  cases,  especially  those  that are
unambiguously within a generally accepted norm.  Bounded rationality-in
the form of ignorance about relevant facts, values, and future developments
or circumstances-provides  an important reason for proceeding in this way.
When  people  lack  sufficient  information  to  design  (satisfactory  or  suffi-
ciently finely tuned) rules, they might resort to  case analysis  instead.  But
bounded rationality is not the only problem.  The argument for case analysis
depends as well on the diversity and plurality of values. t5  These ideas have
an  obvious  bearing  on law,  and  they  have  consequences  for  ethics,  too,
though I will not discuss  ethical issues here.
I urge  as well that both the old art of casuistry  and the old domain of
equity  can be given democratic  foundations.  A legal system committed to
casuistry might insist that every litigant is entitled to urge that he is distinc-
tive, that he deserves distinctive treatment, and that his claims to this effect
warrant a public response.  Insofar as a legal system recognizes  this claim,
its form  of casuistry embodies  norms  of participation  and  responsiveness.
Such a system also seeks to ensure against premature judicial foreclosure  of
issues that should be  subject to democratic  deliberation.
I do not deny that quite serious risks are associated with any effort to
proceed through  case-by-case judgments.  These risks include the abusive
exercise  of  discretion,  lack of predictability  or  of the  capacity  to  form
expectations, high costs of decisions,  failure of political accountability, and
much more.  As a way of reducing those risks, we might evaluate  solutions
through  both  economic  and  democratic  criteria.  For this  reason  I argue
against an ingenious solution proposed by Jeremy Bentham,"6 and  suggest
instead three principal alternatives.  The first is founded principally in mar-
ket rather than  democratic  norms.  It involves  a presumption  in favor  of
13.  See infra notes  155-156  and accompanying  text.
14.  See ALBERT  R.  JONSEN  &  STEPHEN  E. TouLmmN,  THE  ABUSE  OF  CASUISTRY  11-16  (1988).
15.  See infra text accompanying notes  185-190.  See generally ELIZABETH  ANDERSON,  VALUE IN
ETmics  AND  ECONOMICS  (1993)  (discussing plural  values);.
16.  See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct  Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV.  L.  REV.  625  (1984).
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what I will call privately adaptable  rules-rules  that allocate initial entitle-
ments but do not specify end-states, and that harness private forces to deter-
mine outcomes.  Such rules can help break through  some of the dilemmas
posed by the choice between rules and rulelessness;  the crudeness  of rules
is  alleviated by virtue of the power of private  adaptation to particular cir-
cumstances.  Allowing the remedy of "exit"  rather than "voice," " privately
adaptable  rules  are typically  invoked  in support  of economic  markets.  I
argue here that they also deserve an honored  place in a legal  system com-
mitted to correcting the operation of economic markets.
The second approach involves legitimate rule revisions. It recognizes
that officials and citizens  sometimes  have the power  to moderate  rules, or
applications of rules, that no longer make sense.  Juries,  police, and prose-
cutors  all  have  some power to  revise  rules.  Ordinary people  sometimes
exercise  this power as well.
The third approach is pragmatic and more self-consciously casuistical;
its major goal is to make space for the democratic goals of participation and
responsiveness  that  I have just described.  This  last approach  involves  a
highly contextualized inquiry into the levels and kinds of error and injustice
via  rules  or  via rulelessness,  with  special  attention  to  the  nature  of the
forum that will be making the crucial decisions.  Rules cannot be favored or
disfavored in the abstract; everything depends on whether, in context, rules
are superior to the alternatives.  It is therefore important to know something
about the character  of the institutions that will give rise to rules in the first
instance  or apply them after the fact.
I
SouRcEs  OF LAW
Law has a toolbox  containing many devices.  Lawyers have custom-
arily compared  standards  ("do not drive  unreasonably  fast")  to rules  ("do
not  go  over  60  miles  per  hour"), with  rules  seeming  hard  and  fast,  and
standards  seeming  open-ended. 8  There  are  indeed  differences  between
rules  and standards.  But the rules-versus-standards  debate captures  only a
part of what is  at stake,  and it is  important to  have a fuller  sense of the
repertoire of available  devices.  In this section I outline a number of these
devices; my goal is to clarify some terms that will come up throughout the
discussion.
First, however, a cautionary note.  Whether a legal provision  is a rule,
a presumption,  a principle,  a  standard,  a  guideline,  a  set  of factors-or
something else-cannot be decided in the abstract.  Everything  depends on
the understandings and practices of the people who interpret the provision.
Interpretive  practices  can  convert  an  apparently  rule-like  provision  into
17.  The terms  come from ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,  Exrr,  VOICE,  AND  LOYALTY  4  (1970).
18.  See infra text accompanying  notes  22-26 and 33-35.
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something very unrule-like.  The  American Constitution, for example, says
that "Congress  shall make no law ...  abridging the freedom  of speech."' 9
This  provision might  operate  as  a  rule if people  take  it  as  a  flat  ban  on
certain sorts of regulations.  It could operate as a presumption if people see
it as saying that Congress can regulate speech only if it makes a demonstra-
tion of harm of certain kinds and degrees.  Or it could be understood as a set
of factors:  once  we parse  notions  like  "abridging"  and  "the  freedom  of
speech,"  perhaps we will decide cases  on the basis of an inquiry into two,
three, or more relevant considerations.20  The content and nature of a legal
provision cannot be read off the provision.  It is necessary to  see what peo-
ple take it to  be.
For this  reason  we  should  distinguish  among  three  kinds  of actors.
The first is the person or institution that issues the relevant legal provision.
The second is the person or institution that is subject to  the provision.  The
third  is  the person  or  institution  charged with  the power to  interpret the
provision.  If we take a rule to be  a provision  that minimizes  law-making
power in particular cases,2'  a lawmaker  may intend to issue a rule, but the
interpretive  practices of the interpreting  institution may turn the provision
into  something  very  different.  Whether  a provision  is  a rule  or not  is  a
function  of interpretive  practices.  The  lawmaker has  only  limited  power
over those  practices.
A.  Untrammeled  Discretion
By "untrammeled discretion,"  I mean the capacity  to exercise  official
power as one chooses, by reference to  such considerations  as one wants to
consider,  weighted  as  one  wants  to  weight them.  A legal  system  cannot
avoid some degree of discretion,  in the form of power to choose according
to  one's moral or political convictions.22  As we will see, the interpretation
of seemingly rigid rules usually allows for discretion.  But  a legal  system
can certainly make choices about how much discretion it wants various peo-
ple to  have.
A system of untrammeled discretion exists when there are no limits on
what officials may consider in reaching a decision and on how much weight
various  considerations  deserve;  hence  there are no  limits on the officials'
power to decide what to do.  Both inputs and outputs are unconstrained.  In
the real world, untrammeled discretion is quite rare.  Even people with con-
siderable  discretion usually understand  that  some factors  are  irrelevant  in
light of their  roles.  In practice,  however, some police  officers  may come
very  close  to exercising  untrammeled  discretion  in light  of the practical
unavailability  of review.
19.  U.S. CONST.  amend. 1.
20.  See Dennis v. United States,  341  U.S.  494, 508 (1951).
21.  See infra text accompanying  notes 22-26.
22.  See JOSEPH  RAz,  ETmics  IN  THE  PUBLIC  DOMAIN 310, 334  (1994).
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As  we  will  soon  see,  it is  too  simple  to oppose  rules  to  discretion.
Interpretation  of rules necessarily  involves  discretion, and so-called  discre-
tion is rarely untrammeled  in the  legal context.
B.  Rules
Often a system of rules is thought to be the polar opposite of a system
of untrammeled  discretion.  As I have noted, there is no such polar opposi-
tion.  Provisions that appear to be rules may not eliminate discretion.  There
is a continuum  from rules  to untrammeled  discretion,  with factors,  guide-
lines, and standards  falling in between.
The key characteristic of rules is that they attempt to specify outcomes
before particular cases arise.  Rules  are largely defined by the ex ante char-
acter of law.23  By the aspiration to  a system of rules, I therefore mean to
refer to something very simple:  approaches  to law that try to make most or
nearly all legal judgments under the governing legal provision in advance
of actual cases. 24  We have  rules, or (better) "rule-ness,"  to the extent that
the content of the law has been set down in advance  of applications  of the
law.  In the extreme case, all of the content of the law is given before cases
arise.  This is an ambitious goal-impossibly ambitious.  As we will see, no
approach  to law is likely to avoid allowing at least some legal judgments to
be made in the context of deciding actual cases.25  Rules do not, and indeed
cannot, contain all of the instructions necessary for their own interpretation.
Nonetheless, it is possible to ensure that a wide range  of judgments about
particular cases  will occur before the point of application.
On this view, we have  a rule, or rule-ness, to the extent that decisions
about cases have been made ex ante rather than ex post. If a key function
of law  is to assign  entitlements,  a rule  can thus  be defined  as the full or
23.  A qualification is necessary  for rules whose content depends on ex post factors not within the
control of the judge-as in "the outcome depends on what the Pope says" or "an amount not higher than
Frank Thomas'  batting  average."  These are  rules, but  their content  is not supplied in  advance.  This
point shows that an alternative  definition of rules could look to the extent to which the relevant  criteria
are easy to ascertain for  individual cases.  See Stephen  McG. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Knowledge
About Legal Sanctions, 92  MICH. L. REv. 261,271  n.25 (1993).  On this view, rules cannot exist where
it is hard to know relevant criteria.  One source of uncertainty would be discretion to make decisions  ex
post, but uncertainty could also arise if, for example, an adjudication  under provisions specified ex ante
would  depend on  certain facts  that are  hard to  ascertain.  Consider,  for  example,  the ban on  insider
trading under Rule 10(b)(5) of the Securities and Exchange  Act of 1933, which is well-specified ex ante,
but  which requires  determinations of knowledge, materiality,  and so forth that  cannot be made  easily
and  that  will  depend  on  educated,  but  error-prone,  guesses.  See id.,  supra, at 270-71.  For  some
purposes, the "easy to ascertain  criteria"  conception of rules is preferable to the "ex ante specification"
conception,  especially if we are concerned with predictability.  While the two conceptions  overlap, the
latter is a bit easier to  describe and work with, and therefore  I use  it here.
24.  This understanding  is close  to that in Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic
Analysis,  42  Dutn  L.J.  557,  559-60  (1992),  and  I  am  much  indebted  to  Kaplow's  illuminating
treatment.
25.  For a discussion of the open texture of law, see H.L.A.  HART, THE CONCEPT or  LAW  124-29
(2d ed.  1994), infra at text accompanying  notes  100-101.
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nearly full  ex  ante  assignment of legal entitlements, or the complete  or
nearly complete  ex ante specification of legal outcomes.
When  a rule is  in play, the  decision of cases  does  not  depend  on ex
post assignments, as it likely does under a standard-understood  to operate
when,  for example, a judge decides whether someone is liable for nuisance
by  determining  whether  his  conduct  was  "unreasonable"  (assuming  this
term  has  not  been  given  precise  content  in  advance)  or  when  a judge
decides  whether  a  restriction  on  abortion  imposes  an  "undue  burden" 6
(making the same assumption).  In the purest case, the responsibility of the
decision-maker  is to find only the facts; the law need not be found.  When
rules  are  operating,  an  assessment  of  facts,  combined  with  an  ordinary
understanding of grammar, semantics, and diction-and of conventions and
more  substantive  ideas on which there is no dispute-is  usually sufficient
to decide  the case.
Rules may be simple or complex.  A law could say, for example, that
no  one  under  eighteen  may  drive.  It  could  be  somewhat  more  complex,
saying that people  under eighteen  may not drive  unless  they pass  certain
special tests.  Or it could be quite complex, creating  a formula for deciding
who may drive.  It might look, for example, to age, performance  on a writ-
ten examination,  and performance  on a  driving  test.  Each of these three
variables  might be  given a specified numerical  weight.
Rules can also be specific or abstract. Specific rules apply to a narrow
class of cases;  abstract  rules  apply to  a broad class  of cases.  An abstract
rule might say, for example, that no one may drive over sixty miles per hour
or that all cars must be equipped with catalytic  converters.  A specific rule
might say that President Nixon's papers  are public property; that the First
Amendment allows government  to ban advertisements for casino  gambling
when  gambling  has  been unlawful  in the recent  past;  or that  sixth-grade
students  may be suspended without a hearing  for a period of less than two
weeks, if there has been  a serious  allegation of criminal activity.  All rules
are defined in terms  of classes,  but sometimes the rule is narrowly tailored
so  as to pick up only  a few  cases, or perhaps only one.
C.  Rules with Excuses: Necessity or Emergency Defenses
It is familiar to find rules that have explicit  or implicit exceptions for
cases of necessity  or emergency.  It is unfamiliar  to find rules without any
such exceptions.  For example, a person may be banned from taking the life
of another; this is a rule, but self-defense  is a valid excuse.  Many constitu-
tions  allow abridgements  of individual  rights  in  case  of emergency.  The
American Constitution allows the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
26.  See  Planned  Parenthood  v. Casey,  112  S.  Ct.  2791,  2821  (1992)  (opinion  of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter,  JJ.).
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time  of war.'  Other constitutions  say that certain  rights  can be abridged
under unusual  circumstances.28
The  consequences  of making  exceptions  depend on  the details.  An
exception could be narrow but vague, as in the idea that reasonable  limits
on free speech can be made  only under conditions  of war.  The conditions
are rare and the exception therefore narrow, but the meaning of the excep-
tion  is vague  (what  are "reasonable  limits?").  Or the exception  could  be
narrow and specific, as in the idea that under conditions of war, members
of the Communist party may not work for the military in any capacity.  An
exception  might  be broad  and  vague  or  broad  and  specific.  A  specific
exception  might well convert  the rule with exceptions  into a complex rule
or a formula.
D.  Presumptions
A legal system may contain presumptions or presumptive rules.  The
law may presume, for example, that when the government regulates  speech
on the basis of its content, the regulation is unconstitutional. 29  But the pre-
sumption  might be  rebutted  by claims  of a  certain  kind  and strength,  as
when  government  can  show  a  clear  and present  danger.  The  law might
presume that an employer may not discriminate on the basis of race; but the
presumption  might be  rebutted by  a showing  that, for  example,  a  black
actor is necessary to play the part of Othello.
The legal system is pervaded by rules that operate as presumptions  and
that can be countered by showings of a particular kind and degree.  The line
between presumptions and rules with emergency exceptions can be thin.  A
rule with necessity or emergency  exceptions might be described, somewhat
imprecisely, as a strong presumption.  With presumptions, it is necessary to
know what counts as a rebuttal, and whether the presumption and the rebut-
tal are  specific or vague, broad or narrow.
E.  Factors
We might contrast both untrammeled  discretion and rule-bound proce-
dures with approaches  that allow particular judgments to  emerge through
the decision-maker's  assessment and weighing of a number of  relevant  fac-
tors, whose precise content has not been specified in advance. 30  The key
point is that several factors are pertinent to the decision, but there is no rule,
27.  U.S.  CoNsr.  art.  I,  §  9,  cl.  2  ("The  Privilege  of the Writ  of Habeas  Corpus  shall not  be
suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion  or Invasion the public Safety may require  it.").
28.  See, e.g.,  CAN.  CONST. pt. 1, §  1 (rights or freedoms  are  subject "to  such  reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be  demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society");  S.  AxR.  CoNsr.
art. 34, § 4 (constitutional  rights may be suspended with a declaration  of a state  of emergency).
29.  See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114  S. Ct. 2445,2459 (1994)  (requiring "exacting
scrutiny"  of content-based  regulation of speech).
30.  I refer to "factors" rather than "balancing  tests," because the latter term is imprecise.  See infra
notes  157-190  and accompanying text (discussing judgments  based on factors).
1995]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
simple or complex,  to apply.  There is no rule because  the  factors are  not
described  exhaustively  and precisely in advance, and because  their weight
has not been fully specified.  Hence the  decision-maker  cannot rely simply
on "finding the facts" and "applying the law."  The content of the law is not
given; part of it must be found.  There is a degree  of ex post allocation  of
legal entitlements.
On this score, the difference between rules and factors is one of degree
rather than kind.  As we will see, those who interpret provisions that appear
to be rules may be required to determine at least some of their content.  In a
system  of factors,  moreover,  the decision-maker  cannot  do  whatever  she
wants.  But under a system of factors,  the content of the law is created in
large part by those who must apply it to particular cases, and not by people
who laid  it  down in advance.  To  a considerable  extent,  we  do not know
what the law is until the particular cases  arise.
Consider  the  Emergency  Petroleum  Allocation  Act  of  1973,  which
regulated pricing  and allocation of petroleum products from 1973  to  1981.
The statute required the agency to "provide  for" nine factors, "to the maxi-
mum  extent  practicable." 3'  These  factors  were  (1)  protection  of public
health, safety, and welfare; (2) maintenance of all public services;  (3)  main-
tenance  of  agricultural  operations;  (4)  preservation  of  an  economically
sound and competitive petroleum industry; (5)  operation of all refineries  at
full capacity; (6)  equitable distribution of crude oil and petroleum products;
(7)  maintenance  of exploration  for and production  of fuels;  (8) economic
efficiency; and (9)  minimization of interference with market mechanisms.32
Congress  added  that  each  of the  nine  factors  is  equally  important.
There  is much  to  be said  about this  quite  bizarre  list.  What  is  important
here  is that an enumeration  of factors may be possible.
In  most contexts,  however,  any  given  list of relevant  factors  is  not
exhaustive.  Life may turn up other relevant factors that  are hard or impos-
sible to identify in advance.  In most areas of law governed by factors rather
than rules, it is understood that the identified factors, if described at a level
of specificity, are not complete-or that if they are intended to be complete,
they  are  stated  in a  sufficiently  general  and  abstract  way,  so  as to  allow
unanticipated,  additional  considerations to apply.
F.  Standards
Rules  are  often  compared  with  standards.33  A  ban  on  "excessive"
speeds  on the highway  is familiarly thought  to  involve  a  standard;  so  too
31.  Act of Nov: 27,  1973,  § 4(b)(I), Pub.  L. No. 93-159, 87  Stat. 627,  629-30  (1973).
32.  Id.
33.  See generally Kaplow, supra note 24; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private  Law
Adjudication, 89 HAxv.  L. REv.  1685  (1976);  Kathleen  M.  Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and  Standards, 106  HARv.  L. REv. 22 (1992);  Colin S.  Diver, The  Optimal Precision of  Administrative
Rules, 93 YALE L.J.  65  (1983).
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with a requirement that pilots be "competent,"  or that behavior in the class-
room be "reasonable."  As standards, these might be compared with rules:  a
fifty-five miles per hour speed limit, a ban on pilots over the age of seventy,
or a requirement that students sit in particular, assigned  seats.
The contrast between rules and  standards is  quite useful.  It identifies
the fact that with some legal provisions, interpreters have to do a great deal
of work in  order to generate  the necessary  content for  a legal  provision.
With a standard, it is not possible to know what we have in advance.  This
can be a  decisive  political advantage:  Sometimes  people  can agree  on  a
standard  when  they  cannot  agree  on  its  specification.  An  incompletely
specified provision may be the best the political (or judicial) system can do,
as  with  many  constitutional  provisions  and  many  standards  governing
administrative  agencies.
The meaning of a standard depends on what happens with its applica-
tions.  Standards  share  with  factors  a  refusal  to  specify  outcomes  in
advance.  Standards depart from factors in refusing to enumerate  considera-
tions that are relevant in particular applications.34  It would not be accurate,
however,  to  say  that  standards  offer  more  discretion  than  factors.  The
amount of discretion depends on the context and on the nature of the partic-
ular  factors and standards.
Here too, moreover, the character  of the provision cannot be read off
its  text,  and  everything  will  depend  on  interpretive  practices.  Once  we
define the term "excessive,"  we may well end up with a rule.  Perhaps  offi-
cials will decide that a speed  is  excessive when and only  when it is  over
sixty miles per hour.  If a standard is transparent, in the sense that there is a
clear ex ante understanding of its meaning, it is a rule.  We may instead end
up with a set of factors  or a presumption.  Perhaps anyone who  goes over
sixty miles per hour will be presumed to have gone excessively fast, unless
special circumstances  are shown.  Or perhaps the judgment about excessive
speed will be based on need, weather conditions, traffic, time of day, and so
forth.  It is a familiar hope that standards will receive a degree of specifica-
tion as they are interpreted,  since officials may generate categories of cases
that, under the standard, receive predictable treatment.3 5
G.  Guidelines
Avoiding factors, rules, or standards,  the law might establish  ceilings
and floors,  or it might identify  positions  from which  officials  or  citizens
may deviate  if they  can demonstrate  good cause.  Guidelines of this sort
may  be mandatory or they may  be merely  suggestive.  Mandatory guide-
34.  See  Kaplow,  supra note  24, at 559-60.
35.  See  Planned  Parenthood  v.  Casey,  112  S.  Ct.  2791,  2821  (1992)  (opinion  of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter,  JJ.).
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lines36 may be preferred to rules because they allow a degree of flexibility;
they may be preferred to standards insofar as they can discipline behavior in
a  way that  allows  better  monitoring  of discretion.  Thus  guidelines  may
establish  firm  boundaries  beyond  which  no  one  may  go,  and  they  may
require reasons  to be given publicly for any departure  from the norm.  On
the  other  hand,  the flexibility  of guidelines  may  be  a  vice  rather than  a
virtue.
H.  Principles
Principles  are not an  alternative  to  rules, factors,  guidelines,  or stan-
dards.  Their legal status  is  obscure, in part  because the term "principles"
refers to several different phenomena.  In law, principles are often said to be
both deeper  and  more  general than  rules.37  We  might  say that  rules  are
justified by principles, usually political or moral in character.  The justifica-
tion of the rule might be used to interpret its meaning;  courts may resort to
the  principle  in  trying  to  understand  the  rule.  For  example,  there  is  a
(moral) principle  to the effect that it is wrong to take human  life  without
sufficient  cause;  the law  implements  this principle  with  a range  of rules
prohibiting homicide.  Similarly, there  is  a (moral)  principle to the  effect
that it is wrong not to keep your promises; the law contains a range of rules
for enforcement  of contractual  obligations.  Commonly, the term  "princi-
ple"  in law refers to the moral  or political justifications  behind rules.
There  is  another  and  quite  different  understanding  of the notion  of
principle  in  law.  Any  legal  system  contains explicitly  formulated  (legal)
principles  as  well  as  rules;  these  principles  do  not lie  behind  rules  but
instead are brought to bear on the resolution of cases.3 1  Thus it is said that
no person may profit from his own wrong;  that he who  seeks equity  must
do equity;  that ambiguous  statutes should be  construed so  as not to  apply
outside the territorial boundaries  of the United States.3 9  The status of legal
principles  is  somewhat  mysterious;  they  differ  in  weight,  ranging  from
strong  presumptions  to  tie-breakers  when  cases  are  otherwise  in  equi-
poise.40  Sometimes  they operate  as factors.  But principles  are  not rules.
We might say that principles  are more flexible than rules, in the sense that
principles tend to bear on cases without disposing of them.41  This distinc-
36.  One  example  is  the  Federal  Sentencing  Guidelines.  See  generally  UNITED  STATES
SENTENCING  COMMISSION,  FEDERAL  SENTENCING  GUIDELINES  MANUAL  (West 1994).
37.  See FREDERICK  SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY TmE  RuLtr  12-16  (1991).
38.  See  RONALD  DwoPciN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  4-7  (1977)  (discussing  the  difference
between  laws and legal principles used  by courts,  for instance to  invalidate  laws).
39.  Compare  the discussion  of the  Rehnquist Court's  canons of construction in the  appendix  to
William N. Eskridge,  Jr. & Philip  P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108  HARV.  L. Rv. 26,
97-98  (1994).
40.  See HART,  supra note 25,  at 259-63  (discussing Dworkin's  approach).
41.  See Dwoxrn',  supra note 38,  at 24-27.
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tion should not be overstated.42  Any given rule X  is unlikely to resolve all
cases that fall under the literal language  of rule X 43  and principles  can be
crucial  to the disposition of cases.
What is the relationship between a principle and a standard?  If we see
a principle  as the justification  for a rule, the difference  seems  obvious:  a
standard is not a justification  for an  (already  specified) rule, but instead  a
legal provision that needs a good deal of specification to be used to resolve
individual  cases.  If, however,  we understand a principle  to be  a relevant
consideration  in the  decision  of cases,  the distinction  between  principles
and standards  is more complex.  As I understand it here, a legal principle  is
different from a legal standard in the sense that the latter "covers"  individ-
ual  cases  without  specifying  the  content  of  the  analysis  in  particular
instances, whereas a principle is a background notion that does not by itself
cover an individual case,  but is  instead brought to bear on it as a relevant
consideration.  This  is a lamentably vague formulation, but the distinction
should  make  intuitive  sense.  Compare  a  standard banning  unreasonable
risks with  a principle  that statutes  should be construed  to avoid  constitu-
tional  doubts.'
One final complication.  A decision in a case sometimes seems to turn
on a "principle," as in the idea that speech may not be restricted unless there
is a clear and present danger, or that discrimination on the basis of race  is
presumed invalid, or that no contract is valid without consideration.  In this
usage, a principle is not distinguishable from a standard or a presumption,
and at some points below, I will use the terms interchangeably.
I.  Analogies
The last category is not a simple alternative to the others, but it is quite
an  important  tool  that  helps  provide  a  clue  to  how  law  often  operates.
Sometimes a legal system proceeds by comparing the case at hand to a case
(or to  cases) that have come  before.4"  The prior case is inspected  to  see
whether it "controls,"  or should be extended to, the case at hand.  The prior
case will be accompanied by an opinion, which may contain a rule, a stan-
dard,  a  set of factors,  or  something  else.  The  court  deciding  the present
case will inspect relevant similarities and differences.  That court, not bound
by the previous opinion, may produce a rule, a standard, a set of factors, or
something else.  With analogy, we do not have  a decision by rule, because
the rule is not specified  in advance  of the process of analogical  thinking.
42.  See  HART,  supra note 25,  at 262-63.
43.  See infra notes  104-112 and accompanying text.
44.  See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.  116,  129-30  (1958); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't
of Justice,  491  U.S.  440,  465-66  (1989)  (holding  that the  Court  should  construe  statutes  to  avoid
constitutional  questions).
45.  See generally Cass R.  Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv.  L. REv.  741  (1993)
(discussing the role  of analogical reasoning in law).
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When courts proceed with analogies, then, the nature of the legal pro-
vision-its  content  and even  its  character  as  a  rule, a  standard,  a  set of
factors,  or  a guideline-is  not known  before  the analogical  process  takes
place.  The nature of the provision is specified in the case at hand by grap-
pling with the precedent;  we do  not know what  we have before  the  grap-
pling occurs.  It is unusual,  however, for analogical thinking to yield rules.
Most of the time, an analogy will produce a standard, one that makes sense
of the outcomes  in the case  at hand and  the case that came  before.46
II
RULES  AND  THE RULE  OF  LAW
A system of rules is often thought to be the signal virtue of a system  of
law.  Indeed, the rule of law might seem to require  a system of rules.47  The
idea has a constitutional  source.  The  due process  clause  of the American
Constitution is sometimes interpreted so as to require rules, or rule-like pro-
visions, and  to forbid  a system based on analogies, standards,  or factors.48
This is particularly important in the areas of criminal justice and freedom of
speech,  where  the "void  for vagueness"  doctrine  requires the  state to  set
forth clear guidance before it may punish private  conduct.49
Vagueness  exemplifies  a failure of the rule of law.  But what specifi-
cally does the concept of the rule  of law  entail?  It is possible to identify
several  characteristics. 50  A system  committed to the rule of law  seems  to
require  (1) clear, general,  publicly accessible  rules laid  down  in advance;
(2) prospectivity  and  a ban on retroactivity;  (3)  a measure  of conformity
between  law in the books and  law in the  world;5'  (4)  hearing  rights and
availability  of review by independent adjudicative  officials;  (5)  separation
between  law-making and  law-implementation;  (6) no rapid  changes  in  the
content of law; and (7) no contradictions or inconsistency in the law.  These
are the customary characteristics  of a system committed to the rule of law.
Of course, no legal system is likely to comply with these seven goals;  fail-
ures of the rule of law,  understood in  such terms, are  commonplace.
46.  See, e.g., Goss. v. Lopez, 419  U.S.  565, 577-84  (1975)  (applying the Due  Process Clause  to
the temporary suspension  of students from public  school).
47.  See Scalia, supra note 2, at 1179; HAYEK,  ROAD TO  SERFDOM, supra note  12, at 72-87; LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALIT=  OF LAW  106 (1969);  JOSEPH RAZ, THE Au'moRrr  OF LAW 210 (1979).  Justice
Scalia's essay is especially notable insofar as it defends general, judge-made rules as a way of reducing
costs and arbitrariness,  giving  clear signals to citizens,  and reducing judicial discretion.  Scalia, supra
note 2, at  1178-79.
48.  See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,  162 (1972)  (the rule of law requires both
that citizens receive fair notice of legal provisions  and that those  provisions do not encourage arbitrary
or erratic enforcement).
49.  Id.; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21  (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377  U.S. 360, 367-70
(1964);  Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.  566, 572-73  (1974).
50.  See generally FULLER, supra note 47; RAZ,  supra note 47.
51.  For qualifications  to this  principle, see infra notes  219-229 and  accompanying  text.
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A particular advantage of a system of rules is that people who disagree
on much else may nonetheless  agree  about the meaning of a rule.  A rule
that forbids  people from going over fifty-five  miles per hour has  the same
meaning  to Republicans  and Democrats,  libertarians  and socialists,  anar-
chists and members of the Ku Klux Klan.  When a rule of law is in place,
people  can know what the rules  are without adverting  to basic principles.
Indeed,  adverting to basic principles is generally illegitimate,  short of civil
disobedience.
This  is an  oversimplification,  as we will  see.52  Disagreements  about
basic principles may break out in disputes  over the meaning of rules.  But
the oversimplification contains fundamental truth.  And in this oversimplifi-
cation  also  lies  some  of the enduring  truth  of legal  positivism, the  law-
politics  distinction,  and the view  that  ours  is  a  government  of law,  not
human beings.
III
THE  CASE  FOR RULEs
A  great virtue of rules  is that they circumscribe permissible  grounds
for  both  action  and  argument;  by  doing  so,  they  reduce  costs  of many
diverse kinds.  In a heterogeneous  society containing people of limited time
and capacities,  this is an  enormous  advantage.  I am suggesting  that rules
can help people cope with pluralism (even though the existence of pluralism
can make it difficult to generate rules.)5"  Once generated, rules save a great
deal of effort, time, and expense.  By truncating the  sorts of value disputes
that can arise in law, rules also ensure that disagreements will occur along a
narrowly restricted range.
A.  Different Kinds of Rules
I now discuss some of the characteristic virtues of decisions according
to  rules.  First,  however,  it is  important to  note that rules  fall  in several
different  categories.  Here is  a nonexhaustive  account,  tied to my  special
concerns.
1. Often rules are a summary  of wise decisions; they are defended on
the grounds that they are  a good  summary, and  that they  are desirable  as
rules, rather than mere advice or rules of thumb,  so as to  save the costs of
making  individualized decisions.  These costs involve time, labor, and risk
of error. Of course, a rule that counts as a summary of wise decisions iay
operate, for good  pragmatic reasons,  not as a rule of thumb but  as a truly
mandatory rule-one that cannot be revisited during particular applications.
If people over the age of sixty are banned from being commercial pilots, it
is because  this is probably  a pretty accurate  summary of good individual
52.  See infra notes 98-118  and  accompanying  text.
53.  See infra notes  233-251  and  accompanying  text.
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decisions,  and far less costly to administer than any  alternative.  (Consider
the  expenditures  that  would  be  required  to  assess  competence  in  every
case.)  If we say that people with  SAT scores below 500 will not be admit-
ted to  a certain  college, it is  for a similar reason.
2.  Often  rules  establish  conventions, or  otherwise  enable  people  to
coordinate  their  behavior  so  as  to  overcome  collective  action  problems.
This is  true, for example,  with respect to rules of the  road.  The rule that
people must drive on the right-hand  side of the road  is valuable because  it
tells  people  where to  drive, not because  it is  any better  than  its  opposite.
We  do not  think that people  must drive  on the right because  it is  a  wise
decision,  in the  individual  case  unaccompanied  by  rules,  to  drive  on  the
right.  So too, rules  may  solve prisoner's  dilemmas,  in which a  series  of
individually rational decisions can lead to social irrationality or even disas-
ter.  The rules  governing  emission  of pollutants  are  an  example.  If each
polluter  felt  free  to  revisit  the justification  for  the  rules,  the  prisoner's
dilemma  might not be  solved.  The best solution  is probably to  fix  a  rule
and to require everyone  to adhere to it.
3.  Some  rules  have  an  expressive function.54  The  rules  governing
who may marry whom, for example,  say something about the institution  of
marriage  and about social convictions about who is entitled to public recog-
nition of a relational commitment.  Three people cannot be married, nor can
people  of the same  sex.  These  rules do  not summarize  individually wise
decisions, but instead express  a social judgment about relations and  valua-
tions.  We might say that the expressive function of law includes the effects
of law  on  social  attitudes  about relationships,  events,  and  prospects,  and
also  the  "statement"  that law makes  independently  of such  effects. 5  Of
course,  some such statements  and expressions  might be  challenged.
4.  Some rules amount to precommitment strategies,  designed to  over-
come  the problems  of myopia,  lack of information,  weakness  of will,  or
time inconsistency.  Suppose  that in order to  succeed  in  your plans,  you
need to engage in consistent behavior  over time.  Perhaps an  exercise pro-
gram requires you to work out for one hour, and just one hour, every day; or
perhaps a good diet requires you to eat the same things, more or less, at the
same time for a given period.  In these circumstances,  a rule that is enforce-
able through some mechanism-perhaps  social sanctions-may be the best
way to proceed.
Societies face similar problems.  Perhaps  good monetary  policy for a
certain period requires the Federal Reserve Board to do the same thing each
month; suppose that without a rule, and with particularized consideration  of
what to  do each month, the Board would do inconsistent things.  Adoption
54.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability  and Valuation in Law, 92 MIcH.  L.  REv. 779,  820-
24 (1994).
55.  See  Richard H.  Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62  U.  Cm.  L.
REv.  1, 66-71  (1995).
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of a rule may ensure the requisite consistency.  In this way, a rule may be a
precommitment  strategy that overcomes predictable problems with ruleless
decisions.
56
B.  Defending Rules as Rules
Rules might produce  incompletely theorized agreements-agreements
among people who disagree on questions of theory or on fundamental  val-
ues.57  Rules might do this in three different ways.  First, people can some-
times agree  that a rule is binding,  or authoritative,  without agreeing  on a
high theory of why it is binding, and without agreeing that the rule is good.
Theories  of legitimate  authority  are  highly pluralistic,  and  acceptance  of
rules can proceed from  diverse foundations. 5 8
Second, people  can sometimes  converge  on a particular rule  without
taking a  stand on large issues  of the right or the good.  The rule  of stare
decisis-acceptance  of precedents -is  a familiar example; we can accept
that rule from  diverse theoretical  perspectives.  So  too, people  can urge  a
sixty miles per hour  speed limit, a prohibition  on bringing  elephants  into
restaurants,  a  ten-year  minimum  sentence  for homicide,  and  much  more
without taking  a  stand on  debates between  Kantians  and utilitarians,  and
indeed  without  offering  much  in the way  of general theory  at  all.59  Of
course  acceptance  of any legal provision requires  a reason or a principle;
my point is  only that a wide range  of starting points can  sometimes yield
the same rule and  even the same reason or principle, so  long as these are
described  at  a low or intermediate  level  of generality.  When  legislatures
and bureaucracies  issue rules, they  often do  so without getting  into high-
level theory.60
Third,  people may  agree  on the meaning of a rule  despite their dis-
agreement on much else.  Rules also sharply diminish the level of disagree-
ment among people who are subject to them,  and among people who must
interpret and apply them.  Once a rule is in place, large-scale theories need
not be invoked in order for us to know what the rule means, and whether it
is binding.  This generalization is a bit crude; 6' but it is fundamentally right.
In the following section, I am concerned principally with the advantages of
56.  See  JON  ELSTER,  ULYSSES  AND  am  SIRENs  86-111  (1979);  see  also  Stephen  Holmes,
Precommitment  and the Paradox of Democracy, in  CONSTrTuriONALISM  AND  DEMOCRACY  195  (Jon
Elster & Rune  Slagstad eds.,  1988).
57.  See  Cass R. Sunstein, Political Conflict and Legal Agreement,  17  The  Tanner  Lectures  on
Human  Values  (Grethe  B.  Peterson  ed.,  forthcoming);  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Incompletely  Theorized
Agreements, 108 H~Av.  L. REv.  1733  (1995).
58.  See JOSEPH  RAz, THE MoRALrry OF  FREEDOM  58 (1986)  ("More importantly, the practice  [of
proceeding  through rules]  allows the creation of a pluralistic  culture.  For it enables people  to unite in
support of  some  'low or medium level'  generalizations despite profound disagreements concerning their
ultimate foundations,  which some  seek in religion,  others in Marxism or in Liberalism,  etc.").
59.  See id.
60.  See  Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements. supra note 57.
61.  See infra notes  98-118 and accompanying  text.
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rules for those who must enforce and interpret the law, as well as for those
of us who must follow it.
1.  Rules Minimize the Informational and Political  Costs of Reaching
Decisions in Particular  Cases
If we understand rules to be complete or nearly complete  ex ante spec-
ifications of outcomes in particular cases, we can readily see that rules have
extraordinary  virtues.  Because of their  simplifying effects,  rules  produce
enormous  gains where  decisions would otherwise be extremely  expensive.
Every day, people operate  as they do  because of rules,  legal and nonlegal.
Often the rules  are so internalized that they become second-nature,  greatly
reducing the  costs of decisions and making  it possible for people to devote
their  attention to other  matters.62
Because they resolve cases in advance, rules are disabling, but they are
enabling, too.  Like the rules of grammar, they help make social life possi-
ble.  If a rule says that there will be one and only one President, we do not
have to decide how many presidents there will be.  If a rule says that a will
must have two witnesses, we do not have to decide, in each case, how many
witnesses a valid will requires.  Rules facilitate private and public decisions
by establishing the frameworks  within which they can be made, freeing up
time  for other matters.  For example, the justification of a speed  limit is to
promote safety;  that justification  is hardly a rule.  This is because  the pur-
pose of a rule is not itself a rule;  it is a justification  that, in all likelihood,
does not settle  all cases  before the fact.
By adopting rules, people can also overcome their own myopia, weak-
ness of will, confusion, venality, or bias in individual cases.  Rules make it
unnecessary for each of us to examine fundamental issues in every instance;
in  this  way rules  create  a convergence  on particular  outcomes  by people
who  disagree on basic  matters.  Rules  can,  in short,  be the most  efficient
way to proceed, by saving time and effort, and by reducing the risk of error
in  particular  cases.  This  holds  true  for  individuals  and  societies  alike.
Societies and their representatives may also be subject to myopia, weakness
of will, confusion, venality, or bias, and rules safeguard  against all of these
problems.
These ideas justify the general  idea that rules should be  entrenched in
the sense that they apply  even  if their rationale  does  not.63  A rule is  not
really a rule if decision-makers  feel free to disregard it when its application
is not supported by its justification; if decision-makers  investigate  the pur-
pose for a rule before applying it, they convert the rule into something very
close to a standard or set of factors.
62.  Cf HART,  supra  note 25,  at 9-11,  54-59 (distinguishing between rules and habits).  Both rules
and habits can be  internalized.
63.  See  SCHAUER,  supra note 37, at 12-16, 47-52.
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There  is much to be said on behalf of refusing to inquire into the pur-
poses of rules.64  If we substitute for each rule an investigation of whether
its application  is justified  in each instance,  we are  engaging in a form  of
case-by-case  decision-making,  and  it is  easy  to  underestimate  the  often-
substantial costs of that way of proceeding.  Officials may be pressed by the
exigencies of a particular case to seek individualized justice, without seeing
the enormous  expense and risk of unfairness in systematically pursuing that
approach.
Some  of the  costs  of rulelessness  are  simply  a matter  of compiling
information.  To know whether a particular pilot is able to fly competently
(a standard),  it is necessary to know a lot of details.  But some costs are of a
different character.  Suppose that we are deciding  on emissions  levels  for
substances that contribute to destruction of the ozone layer, or that we are
thinking about when to go forward with projects that threaten  endangered
species.  Information  is important here, but it is also necessary for multiple
people  to reach closure  on hard  and  even tragic matters.  For this reason,
there may be great difficulty in producing a rule; proceeding through  stan-
dards  or factors may involve lower political costs  ex ante.  But once  a rule
is set forth, individual officials can bracket those matters and take the deci-
sion  as a given."  One advantage  of having  rules  is that those who must
interpret rules need not make  difficult judgments  about first principles.
The high costs-informational and political-of ruleless decisions are
often not invisible to those who  are deciding whether to lay down rules in
the first instance.  The Supreme Court, for example, can see that rules will
bind its members, perhaps unfortunately, in subsequent cases, and therefore
might avoid  rule-making  in the interest  of maintaining  flexibility  for the
future.  The Court might so decide without easily seeing that the absence of
rules will force litigants and lower courts to guess, possibly for a generation
or more, about what will turn out to be the real content of the law. 66  In this
way the Court can internalize the benefits of flexibility while "exporting"  to
others the  costs of rulelessness.  So too, legislatures can see that rules may
contain major mistakes, or that they cannot be compiled without large infor-
mational and political costs-without, perhaps, fully understanding that the
absence  of rules  will force  administrative agencies  and  private  citizens to
devote enormous effort to  giving the law some concrete  content.
Thus far I have emphasized  the benefits of rules to legal institutions.
But a particular advantage of rules, connected with the informational cost of
rulelessness, is that they enable people to make plans without fear of sanc-
64.  See, e.g., id. at 229-33.
65.  This argument  supports  the  result in Tennessee  Valley Auth. v. Hill,  437 U.S.  153,  172-75
(1978)  (protecting  snail darters  vithout regard to costs).
66.  See  Scalia, supra note 2, at  1178-80,  1186  (discussing negative  effects of balancing tests and
other non-prospective  standards).
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tions.67  Rules  can therefore  provide  strong incentives  for people  to  bring
their  behavior into  compliance.  While many of the various  costs of rule-
lessness must be borne by public officials, high  costs can be borne by citi-
zens and corporations as well.  People will have to invest large  amounts of
resources  in trying to predict  outcomes.
Legal rules  can also  overcome  social myopia.  Myopia  may take the
form of decisions whose  short-term net benefits  are high but whose  long-
term costs dwarf their  long-term benefits.  Consider, as possible examples
of rules  overcoming  myopia,  the  social  security  disability  grid68  and
mandatory retirement rules.  For instance, an airline may derive great short-
term  benefit  from retaining  an  experienced pilot beyond  a predetermined
retirement age;  but such  a decision may lead to high long-term  costs  from
monitoring  every pilot  individually and  from risking  mistaken  decisions.
Of course, the various  costs of rulelessness  may be lower than those pro-
duced by certain rules, and  thus it cannot be  said, in the abstract, whether
rules  are better than rulelessness  from the standpoint of private  citizens  or
society as a whole.  A company would probably prefer a law calling for an
assessment of five  factors  before  any pollutant  may  be  banned to  a  law
saying that  all pollutants  are  banned.  A homosexual  rights  group  would
prefer a law saying that discrimination  against homosexuals will be prohib-
ited where a three-part  test so suggests to a law saying that discrimination
against homosexuals  is always acceptable.  We can still say, however, that
factors will produce costs of certain kinds, and that these costs may be very
high.  Note  in this  regard that  mechanical  formulas  often  perform  better
than  clinical  discretion  in  the  areas  of medical  diagnosis  and  academic
performance.
69
2.  Rules Are Impersonal and Blind; They Promote Equal Treatment and
Reduce the Likelihood of  Bias and Arbitrariness
We have  seen that rules may reduce human error caused by confusion
or ignorance. They can also  counteract  something worse:  bias,  favoritism,
or discrimination  in the minds  of people who  decide particular  cases.  In
this way, rules are associated with  impartiality, a notion which is  captured
in the idea that Justice, the goddess, is  "blindfolded."70  Rules are blind to
many features of a case that might otherwise be relevant, and that are rele-
vant in some social contexts, or to many things on whose relevance people
have great difficulty in agreeing-religion, social class, good or bad looks,
height, and so forth.
67.  See  Kaplow, supra note 24, at 568-86.
68.  See Heckler v. Campbell,  461  U.S. 458, 461-62 (1983).
69.  See JON ELsTER,  LocA.  JusTIcE  169 (1992).
70.  See generally  Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnick, Images of  Justice,  96 YALE L.J.  1727 (1987)
(discussing anthropomorphic depictions  of "blind Justice").
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The  claim that rules promote generality and in that sense equal  treat-
ment requires  an  important  qualification.  Of course  rules  suppress  many
differences  among cases;  they single out a particular feature  common to a
range of cases and subsume  all such cases under a single umbrella.  In this
sense, rules make irrelevant  features of cases that might turn out, on reflec-
tion  by  people  making  particular  judgments,  to  be  relevant  indeed.71
Should everyone who has exceeded sixty miles per hour be treated the same
way?  Should  everyone  falling in  a particular unfortunate  spot in a social
security grid be denied benefits?  If equality requires the similarly situated
to be treated similarly, the question is whether people are similarly situated,
and rules do not permit  a particularized inquiry on that score.  In this way,
rules  may actually  frustrate equal treatment;  rulelessness  may promote it.
3.  Rules Serve Appropriately Both to Embolden and to Constrain
Decision-Makers in Particular  Cases 72
A special advantage  of rules is that judges (and others) can be embold-
ened  to  enforce  them  even when  the particular  stakes  and the particular
political  costs  are high.7 3  Because  rules resolve  all cases before the fact,
rules can make it easier  for officials to  stick with certain unpopular judg-
ments when they should do so, but might be tempted to back down.
Suppose, for example, that the Supreme Court has set out the Miranda
rules,74  and that everyone knows that they will be applied mechanically to
every  criminal  defendant.  If so, judges  can refer to those rules,  and in a
sense  hide  behind  them,  in  cases  in  which  the  defendant  is  especially
despised, and  in which it is tempting to say that the Miranda rules  should
yield  before  a  multifactor  test  to  be  resolved  against  the  defendant.
Similarly,  the implementing  doctrines  for free  speech  can  provide judges
with an acceptable way to make correct but unpopular decisions.  For exam-
ple, if a rule banning viewpoint discrimination  is entrenched  in the law of
free speech, judges can defer to that rule in protecting flag-burning,  even in
the face of severe  and otherwise irresistible public pressure.7 5
The  key  advantage  here  (one that  can be  a  disadvantage  too)  stems
from the fact that rules decide cases before they arise.  By settling cases in
advance, rules  also  make it unnecessary  and  even illegitimate to return to
first principles.  Ifjudges are allowed to decide the content of law without a
firm  rule, and  if they have  to  go back to  first  principles  each time,  they
71.  See  SCHAUER,  supra note  37,  at 136-37.
72.  See Scalia, supra note 2, at  1185  (discussing his greater willingness  to decide  cases arising
under a  "clear congressional  command").
73.  Cf  id. at  1186  (criticizing  lack of guidance  for  future  decision-makers  when  balancing of
interests  is used).
74.  See Miranda  v. Arizona, 384 U.S.  436  (1966).
75.  See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,318-19 (1990)  (holding prosecution under a
federal  ban on flag burning violated defendant's  First Amendment rights).
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might not adhere to those principles at all when the stakes become high  at
the (politically  charged)  point of application.
In one sense rules reduce the responsibility of the official for particular
cases,  by allowing her to claim that it is not her choice,  but the choice of
others who have laid down the rule.76  Officials can claim that the previous
choice is not being  made, but simply followed.  When the rule is ambigu-
ous,  this  claim  is fraudulent.  But  it is true  when  the rule  is  clear.  In  a
system in which rules are binding, and are seen to be binding, the law  can
usefully stiffen the judicial spine,  and this may be necessary  to safeguard
individual liberty against public  attack.
At the  same time, rules  reduce the risk that illegitimate  or irrelevant
factors will enter into the decision, at least compared with standards  or fac-
tors.  When  a judge  has  the  discretion  to  apply  standards  or  factors  to  a
case,  unarticulated  considerations  may  weigh in  the  balance.  A judge's
sympathetic or unsympathetic reaction to a particular party (or lawyer) may
tip the balance in a case based on factors.  This is less likely when rules are
operative.  Here,  too,  rules  have  large  virtues  in  a system  that aspires  to
consistent decisions amidst  heterogeneity.
4.  Rules Promote Predictability  and Planning  for Private  Actors and
for the Government
In  modem  regulation,  a pervasive  problem  is that members  of regu-
lated classes face ambiguous and conflicting guidelines,  so that they do not
know how to plan.  For people who  are subject to public  force, it becomes
especially important to know what the law is before the actual  case  arises.
Indeed, it may be  more important  to know what the law is than  to  have a
law  of any particular  kind.  Consider,  for instance,  the Miranda rules.  A
special  virtue  of those rules  is  that they tell  the  police  specifically  what
must be done, eliminating the guessing  games that can be so destructive to
ex ante planning.  So,  too, in the environmental  area,  where prospectively
clear  rules,  even if strict,  are  often  far  better  than  the  "reasonableness"
inquiry characteristic of the common law.  Under a multifactor test, by con-
trast, neither government officials  nor affected  citizens  may reliably  know
their  obligations in advance.
5.  Rules Increase Visibility and Accountability
When rules are at work, it is clear who is responsible  and who  is to be
blamed  if things  go  wrong.  This  is  most  obviously  valuable  when  the
rulemaker has a high degree of accountability and legitimacy:  consider the
President and Congress.  One problem with a system based on standards  or
factors-environmental  law, for example-is that no one knows  whom to
76.  See ROBERT M. CovER, JusrncE  ACCUSED  147-48  (1975); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality,
2 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  351,  388  (1973).
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hold ultimately responsible if the air stays dirty or is cleaned up at excessive
cost.  By contrast,  if the Miranda rules  create  a law  enforcement  or civil
liberties  problem, the Court is obviously to blame.  If a different due pro-
cess calculus based on factors were to produce serious problems, it is possi-
ble that the Court itself would escape the scrutiny it deserved.  People might
blame the lower-court judges assessing the factors, rather than the Court in
instituting  them.
There  is a related point.  Without rules, the exercise of discretion can
be invisible, or at least less visible to the public and affected parties.  At the
same time, rules allow the public to monitor compliance much more  easily
than a system of factors would.  For instance, the public can easily ascertain
if the police  are following  a correct procedure  or if officers  are  failing to
give Miranda warnings to  all arrestees.  Compliance with a ban on "invol-
untary"  confessions is  harder to supervise.
6.  Rules Avoid the Humiliation of Subjecting People to Exercises of
Official Discretion in Their Particular  Case
A  special  advantage  of rules  is  that because  of their fixity,  ex ante
quality, and generality, they make it unnecessary for citizens to ask an offi-
cial  for permission to engage  in certain  conduct.  Rules turn citizens  into
right-holders,  able  to  expect  certain  treatment  as  a  matter  of  right.
Standards, guidelines,  or factors  are more likely to make  citizens into  sup-
plicants, requesting  official  help.  Importantly, factors  and standards  allow
mercy, in the form of relief from the consequences  of rigid rules.  But rules
have  the  comparative  advantage  of  forbidding  officials  from  being
unmoved by, or punitive toward, a particular applicant's  request.
Compare, for example, a rule of mandatory retirement for people over
the age of seventy (a rule) with a law that would permit employers to  dis-
charge employees who, because of their age, are no longer able to perform
their job "adequately"  (a standard).  One advantage  of the former over the
latter is that if you are an  employee, it may be especially humiliating  and
stigmatizing to have employers decide that age has rendered you incompe-
tent.  A rule avoids this inquiry altogether, and it might be favored for this
reason even if it is both over- and under-inclusive.
7.  Rules Promote Equal Application of the Law
It is also plausible to think that case-by-case judgments  systematically
favor the well-to-do.  Litigation is extremely expensive,  and for litigants to
seek  fine-grained,  individualized judgments,  they  need  resources.  In  an
ideal world, case-by-case  particularization  might allow  for more equitable
judgments tailored to particular facts.  But in this world,  it may result in a
pervasive  form  of inequality, in which people without resources  stand on
the sidelines,  or  are  unable to  persuade  officials  that their  case  warrants
favorable treatment.
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AGAINST  RULES
A.  Introductory Note
I now identify three arguments  against rules.  The first challenge is that
rules embody "formal  equality" and  are for this reason too conservative  or
too closely associated with excessively free markets;  in this way, rules  are
said  to  be  sectarian  after all.  The second  challenge,  making  the way  for
casuistry, is that rules cannot do what is claimed of them, since a degree  of
case-by-case judgment will indeed break out at the moment of application.
On this view, casuistry is inevitable or nearly so.  The third challenge is that
the generality of rules, and their blindness to particulars, is a political vice,
because  a just system would allow equity through adaptation to the particu-
lars of individual cases.  This third challenge  points toward casuistry  as a
substitute  for  rule-making  and  rule-application.  I  conclude  that  there  is
nothing in the first challenge, some important truth in the second, and some
enduring  wisdom in the third.
B.  The Rule of Law as a Check on Legislation
Before exploring  these  arguments, it is  important to  examine  a  com-
mon but misleading claim about rules.  Some people think that the require-
ments  of the rule of law  provide  an  important  check  on partisanship  or
selectivity in decision-making."  On this view, the rule of law is a require-
ment of generality,  and this requirement  forbids  law from imposing  selec-
tive benefits  or selective  burdens.  In  this notion  lies  much  of the  debate
over the ideas of impartiality and neutrality in law.  There  is some truth in
this claim, but it also contains  an important confusion.
An influential discussion  appears in Justice  Robert Jackson's  concur-
ring opinion in the Railway Express case.78  New York City prohibited any-
one from operating an "advertising vehicle" on the  streets, that is, a vehicle
that  sells  its  exterior  for  advertising  purposes.  The  New  York  law
exempted from the general prohibition advertising  of the  owner's business
placed on vehicles engaged  in the ordinary business of the owner, and not
used  mainly or only for advertising.
Railway Express, a company operating nearly 2000 trucks for advertis-
ing  purposes,  challenged  the New  York  law  under  the  due  process  and
equal protection  clauses.  The Supreme Court upheld the law, emphasizing
that judges should defer to legislatures,  and noting that the local authorities
might have believed that people who advertise their own wares on trucks do
not present the same traffic problems.79  The Court added that "the fact that
New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction but
77.  See  HAYEK,  CONSTITUTION  OF  LmERTY,  supra note  12,  at 226-27.
78.  Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.  106,  111-17 (1949)  (Jackson, J., concurring).
79.  Id. at  110.
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does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such
as the vivid displays on Times Square,  is immaterial.  It is no requirement
of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at
all."8  In this way the Court rejected the idea that the principle of generality
imposed  serious limits on legislative  classifications.
Justice Jackson took this seemingly  mundane case  as an occasion for
celebrating the use of the  equal protection clause as a guarantor of the rule
of law, understood as a ban on selectivity.  Justice  Jackson began by con-
trasting the  due process  clause with the equal  protection  clause.  The due
process  clause does not require equality; instead it imposes  a flat barrier to
legislative enactments.  In this way it "leaves ungoverned and ungovernable
conduct which many people find objectionable."'"  But the equal protection
clause is not similarly disabling:  "It merely  means that the prohibition  or
regulation must have a broader  impact."8 2  The requirement  of breadth in
turn serves a democratic  function.
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable  government  than to require that the principles  of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed gen-
erally.  Conversely,  nothing  opens  the door  to  arbitrary  action  so
effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few
to whom they will apply legislation  and thus to escape the political
retribution  that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected.  Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will
be just than to require that laws be equal  in operation.83
In Justice  Jackson's  view, a requirement of generality  helps to  flush
out illegitimate reasons  for legislation.  If the law is imposed on some but
not  all,  it  may  be  based  on prejudice.  Perhaps  the  law  is  a  means  of
oppressing a particular group; if it cannot be passed unless it is partial, we
may suppose that it is undergirded by something other than the articulated
justification.  Perhaps  it is a form of rent-seeking  or  supported  solely by
private  pressure.
There is much good sense here.  A system of law should require gen-
eral justifications  for the  denial  of benefits  or the imposition  of burdens.
Moreover, the requirement of generality can produce political checks where
opposition would otherwise  be too weak to prevent oppressive  legislation
from going forward.  For example,  the public might willingly accept a law
forbidding Nazis from wearing swastikas in public where they would reject
a more generalized rule  against the display of political insignia.
But how are we to know when a seemingly narrow enactment should
be applied generally?  Is it illegitimate, for example, to exempt labor unions
80.  Id.
81.  Id. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring).
82.  Id.
83.  Id. at 112-13.
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from the antitrust laws,  electric cars from the Clean Air Act, insane people
from the ordinary operation of the homicide laws, or small businesses from
occupational  safety and health regulation?  Is it illegitimate to say that blind
people cannot  receive drivers'  licenses,  or that felons  cannot vote?  These
are  all examples  of rules that might be  thought to  have  escaped  from the
requirement of generality.
To determine whether generality is required, it is necessary to ascertain
whether  there  are  relevant  similarities  and  relevant  differences  between
those burdened and those not burdened by legislation.  No  one thinks  that
"generality"  should  be  required  when relevant  differences  exist.  No  one
supposes  that the speed  limit laws are  unacceptable  because  they  do  not
apply to  police officers and  ambulance  drivers operating  within the  course
of their official duties.  Indeed, Justice Jackson  did not even vote to invali-
date the New York law:  "[T]he  hireling may be put in  a class by himself
and may be dealt with differently than those who act on their own."' 8 4
We should conclude that any requirement of equal  treatment depends
on a substantive  account establishing whether there are relevant differences
between the cases to which a law applies and the cases to which it does not.
If a law says that in order to receive federal  employment,  everyone who is
not white must take certain tests, we can easily see that the grounds for the
distinction are illegitimate.  In such a case, Justice Jackson's analysis seems
sufficient  and  unimpeachable.  But  sometimes  the  plea  for  generality  is
based  on more  controversial  grounds.  In  such  cases,  the requirement  of
generality hides a range of substantive judgments, and those judgments can-
not be  supplied by the requirement itself.
With  all this,  we  have come  far  from rules  and the rule  of law.  In
deciding whether  a plausible ground for discrimination and hence selectiv-
ity is a permissible  one,  courts are not merely requiring generality  but are
second-guessing  legislative judgments about who is similar to whom.  The
rule of law, by itself, does not have the resources to resolve the resulting
debates.  The  requirement  of rule-bound  decisions  has  numerous  virtues,
but we  should be  careful  not to overstate what it requires.85
V
AGAINST  RULES,  I:  Is  THE RuLE  OF LAW Too  CONSERVATIVE  OR
Too CLOSELY ASSOCIATED  WITH  FREE  MARKETS?
These points provide reason to doubt Friedrich Hayek's influential  dis-
cussion of rules and the rule of law. 6  Hayek identifies the rule of law with
a norm of "impartiality."  Its antonym  is a system of "planning,"  in which
the state picks winners  and losers.  Hayek  claims that general rules lead to
impartial  decisions among  different groups.  Because  the rule  of law does
84.  Id. at 115.
85.  See also RAZ,  supra note 47,  at 219-23  (describing  values in the rule  of law).
86.  See  HAYEK,  CONsTITUTIoN  OF LIBERTY,  supra note  12, at 220-33.
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not pick out particular winners  and losers, it does not play favorites,  and in
this sense it is impartial.  Hayek concludes that there is a close association
between the rule of law and free markets, both of which require generality.
But what is  the partiality that the requirement of generality  forbids?
Hayek  does not disapprove of much that is done in the name of the regula-
tory state.  On his view, government  provision of many public  services  is
unobjectionable.8 7  Nor  does  he  disapprove  of "general  rules  specifying
conditions  which  everybody  who  engages  in  a certain  activity  must  sat-
isfy."'  This category  includes  regulation  of production,  maximum  hour
laws,  laws banning  dangerous products,  and laws protecting  conditions  in
the workplace.
What, then,  is prohibited?  Hayek  is concerned  about those  measures
that "involve  arbitrary  discrimination  between  persons." 9  This  category
includes most importantly "decisions  as to who is to be allowed to provide
different services  or commodities, at what prices or in what quantities-in
other words, measures designed to control the access to different trades and
occupations, the terms  of sale, and the amounts  to be produced or sold."9
Here Hayek appears to be speaking of the related requirements of gen-
erality, impartiality,  and  equality;  his  argument  is very much  like  that of
Justice Jackson.  Certain measures violate these requirements because they
make arbitrary distinctions.  But how do we know whether  a distinction is
arbitrary?  How  do  we know whether  the  state  can "control  the access to
different trades and  occupations"?  It is not thought impermissible for the
state to require taxi drivers to show that they have good eyesight, or to ban
people  from practicing medicine  without meeting certain requirements  of
medical  competence.  Hayek  himself  emphasizes  that  in  some  circum-
stances  the  state  may  impose  occupational  qualifications.9  It  therefore
emerges that the  state is  banned from  imposing qualifications  only when
they are truly arbitrary.  To decide this question, it is necessary to develop a
theory  of appropriate  qualifications.  The rule  of law,  standing  by  itself,
could not possibly supply that theory.
What about price controls? Hayek is concerned that any prices must be
constantly adjusted; he also thinks that since they abandon the relationship
between  supply and  demand, governmentally-fixed  prices  "will not be the
same for  all sellers"  and that they  will "discriminate  between  persons on
essentially arbitrary grounds."92  His conclusion is that all controls of prices
and quantities  "must" be arbitrary.93
87.  Id.  at 223  (finding  government  services  acceptable  when  private  enterprise  is  unable  to
provide them, or when a government  acts analogously to a private market participant).
88.  Id. at 224.
89.  Id. at 227.
90.  Id.
91.  Id.
92.  Id. at 228.
93.  Id.
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Of course  government  controls  of prices  and  quantities  are  usually
harmful  or  even  disastrous,  and much  of what  can  be  said  against  them
relates to their rejection of the forces of supply and demand.  But insofar as
he  is invoking the rule of law, Hayek's  claim is unconvincing.  Price  con-
trols can  satisfy  all of the rule-of-law requirements  described  above:94  if
price controls were stable, public, general, and so forth, they would be con-
sistent with the rule of law.  The judgment that they are arbitrary stems not
from  the  notion  of the  rule  of law,  but  from  an  independent  theory,
grounded in ideas about efficiency  and liberty, to the effect that the appro-
priate prices and quantities of goods and services  are those set by the mar-
ket.  That is a reasonable judgment, but it is not part of the rule of law.  It is
an independent point requiring an independent defense.
It  might be  tempting  at this point  to suggest  that much  of Hayek's
discussion  is simply confused,  and that the rule  of law has  nothing  to  do
with markets at all.  What can be said on behalf of markets, or against price
controls,  is  different from  what  can be  said  against rule-free  government.
But this conclusion would be too simple.  There  are at least three common
features  in the operation of markets  and a system  of rules.  First, rules  do
not aspire to make ex post adjustments.  Rules operate prospectively;  they
take the ex ante perspective.  Enthusiasts for markets aspire to do the same
thing.  In markets,  outcomes  are not specified  in advance, for the winners
and losers  will  emerge  from  a complex process  of bargaining. 9 5  Second,
there is a sense  in which both rules  and markets  are "no  respecter of per-
sons."  For advocates of the rule of law, government, like justice, should be
"blind."  Markets  are  similarly  blind.  Third,  both  rules  and  markets  can
ensure  against measures  that impose inappropriate  informational  demands
on  government.  Government  price-fixing  is  especially  objectionable
because  it requires government to do something that it lacks information to
do well; when markets  set prices, they take  advantage  of a wide  range of
information  unavailable to  official price-fixers.  The same argument can be
invoked  on  behalf of many rules.  By  setting  out  rules  of  the  road,  or
requirements for the transfer of land, government can appropriately allocate
informational  burdens between  itself and others.
On the other hand, all of the government actions that Hayek finds com-
patible  with  the  rule  of law  do,  in  a  sense,  pick  winners  and  losers.
Certainly this is true for maximum hour laws; it is also true for the provi-
sion of governmental services.  And though the common law may not pick
winners and  losers, it is  often  quite  predictable  who  will be favored  and
who will be disfavored  under the ordinary rules of property, tort, and con-
tract.  Severely disabled  people, for example,  are unlikely to  do  well in a
market  system run under the common law.  Moreover,  there is a theoretical
94.  See supra text accompanying  notes 50-51.
95.  Of course, the laws that underlie markets may be standards rather than rules; consider the law
of torts,  which is pervaded by standards.
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possibility that a system of planning could be made consistent with the rule
of law, at least if the "plans" were announced in advance and if expectations
were firmly protected.96  Probably most real-world  systems of planning are
unable to conform to such requirements.  But in his opposition to "planned"
systems, Hayek seems to have something  else in mind, concerning the way
in which plans play favorites.  The notion that plans play favorites is para-
sitic  on the unarticulated understanding of fair processes and distributions.
That understanding has nothing to  do  with the rule of law.
These points cast doubt not only on Hayek's view but also  and for the
same  reasons  on  Marxist-inspired  attacks  on the  rule  of law.  Consider
Morton Horwitz'  suggestion:
Unless we are prepared to succumb to Hobbesian pessimism 'in this
dangerous century,'  I do not see how a Man of the Left can describe
the  rule  of law  as  'an  unqualified  human  good'!  It  undoubtedly
restrains power, but it also prevents power's benevolent exercise.  It
creates  formal  equality-a not  inconsiderable  virtue-but  it pro-
motes substantive  inequality by creating  a consciousness  that radi-
cally separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from
outcomes.  By promoting  procedural justice  it enables  the shrewd,
the calculating,  and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own
advantage.  And it ratifies  and legitimates  an adversarial,  competi-
tive, and atomistic conception  of human relations.97
There is much to be said about this passage.  For present purposes the
key point is that the passage takes the rule of law to require much more than
in fact it does.  Does the rule of law forbid the pursuit of substantive  equal-
ity through,  for example,  progressive  income  taxes,  welfare and  employ-
ment  programs,  antidiscrimination  laws,  and  much  more?  Like  Hayek,
Horwitz appears to identify the rule of law with (a particular conception of)
market  ordering.  The identification  is unwarranted.
I conclude that the rule  of law does not have the features that Hayek
understands  it to have.  A  familiar  challenge  to rules-that they promote
merely  formal  equality-is  therefore  unconvincing.  Rules  could  provide
that no person  may have  more than  one  dollar more than  anyone  else,  or
that the average  income of men and  women must be the same, or that all
racial groups  must have the same proportional wealth.  There  is no neces-
sary association between rules on the one hand and conservatism,  free mar-
kets,  or inequality on the other.
96.  See  generally  JoHN  E.  ROEMEp,  A  FUTURE  FOR  SOCIALISM  (1994)  (defending  market
socialism).
97.  Morton J. Horwitz,  The Rule of  Law: An  Unqualified Human Good?,  86  YALE L.J. 561,  566
(1977)  (book review).
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VI
AGAINST  RULES,  11:  ARE  RULES  FEASIBLE?
A.  Challenges
Calling themselves rule-skeptics,  some people  question the  feasibility
of rules  and the rule of law.98  Usually they focus  on the internal point of
view-on how lawyers and judges, operating within the  legal system,  fig-
ure  out what rules  mean.  If rules  are really understood  as  a  full  ex ante
allocation  of legal rights, it is said, rules are impossible or very close to  it.
Fixity in this ex ante sense is not possible.  Encounters  with particular cases
will confound the view that things really have been fully settled in advance.
In this view, the need for  interpretation,  and the likelihood  of competing
interpretations  founded on disagreements about the good or the right, defeat
the project of following rules.
A  central  point here  is  that because  of the nature  of language,  legal
rules will leave a variety of gaps and ambiguities; there will be no ordinary
or literal meaning in many cases.  Even when the meaning of a legal term is
clear in ordinary parlance,  in the abstract, or in the dictionary, uncertainty
or ex post judgments may break out at the point of application.99  In Hart's
terms,  rules  have an  "open  texture,"100  stemming  from two  factors:  the
rule-makers'  ignorance of fact and the rule-makers'  indeterminacy  of aim.
No law is  issued with  full knowledge  of the factual  situations  to  which it
will be applied,  and no law is enacted with  full understanding  of or agree-
ment on its  animating purposes.  When the law confronts  an unanticipated
situation raising questions about  its underlying  goals, the problem of open
texture will arise, and people interpreting the law will have  discretion, in a
sense, to make law on their own.  c0  Thus, for example, a law banning dogs
from  a restaurant  may have uncertain  meaning  and  require  ex post judg-
ments as applied to a blind person with a seeing-eye dog, or a police officer
using a german  shepherd  to  search  for bombs.
If we are  fanatical  about limiting  interpretive  discretion,  we will  be
disturbed  to  find that  laws  apparently  intended  as  ex ante rules  call  for
judgments  by  interpreters  at the point  of application,  especially  if those
judgments involve law-making or choices on issues of politics and morality.
But perhaps  this is  not a decisive  problem  with  a  system of rules.  Some
laws that appear to be rules are really standards:  their terms squarely invite
98.  See HART,  supra note  25, at  124-54, for a still-valuable discussion.  See generally Kennedy,
supra note 76.
99.  See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries  and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REv.  1437,
1445-53  (1994)  (cautioning that dictionary  definitions can  also be  indeterminate).
100.  HART,  supra note 25, at  128.  Hart  draws the  term  from F. WVaismann,  Language Strata, in
LoGic AND  LA  aUAGE  I  1 (Antony  Flew ed.,  1953).
101.  The right  description of legal judgment  in the  face of open  texture  is part  of what  divides
positivists from Ronald Dworkin.  Compare DwoRKn,  supra note 41, at 350-54  (defending judges who
interpret  laws according to  their "convictions  about justice  and fairness")  with RAz,  supra note 22,  at
206-10  (criticizing Dworkin).
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moral or political judgments.  Laws that use words like "equal"  or "reason-
able"  or "carcinogen"  are likely to fall in this category.  To this extent,  such
provisions  do not qualify as rules  at all.  They are incompletely specified,
and most people understand this fact.
A more fundamental  objection to the project of rule-following  is that
all or almost all decisions under a rule will involve  ex post moral or polit-
ical judgments, even where there is no invitation for such judgments  from
the text of the rule itself or from its drafters.  Even laws that appear confin-
ing, and quite rule-like, may require interpreters to  give them content at the
point of application-not only the judgment to be bound by law itself, but
also  substantive  understandings  that  go  into  the  interpretation  of legal
terms.  If this is so, a degree  of law-making through encounter with particu-
lar cases  is  inevitable.  Even apparently  rigid rules  do not  fully allocate
entitlements ex ante.
To  outline the argument  in advance:  The very fact that a rule has at
least one exception (as nearly all rules do), and the very fact that the finding
of this  exception  is  part of ordinary  interpretation,  means  that in  nearly
every  case  a judge  is presented  with  the question  of whether  the rule  is
reasonably  interpreted  to  cover  the  circumstances  at  issue.  Usually  that
question is easy-so easy that it does not even register.  But any judgment
whether to apply the rule to the particular case depends on a moral or polit-
ical  claim  about relevant differences  and relevant  similarities  between  the
acknowledged  exception  and the  case at hand.  Hence  a degree  of ex post
judgment is  inevitable.
In this way,  substantive  claims  at the point of application  lie behind
most claims about what the law is.  When the meaning of law seems to be a
simple matter of fact,102  it is not because  there has been no resort to  sub-
stantive argument, but because people agree on what substantive arguments
are persuasive under the circumstances.  This is so not merely in the sense
that people  agree that as a moral matter, they ought to apply the law.  It is
so in the more fundamental sense that their view about what the law means
has  an  important  moral  or political  dimension. 1 0 3  Of course,  substantive
judgments  are  malleable  over  time,  and  when  prevailing  views  change,
judgments of meaning, even of relatively plain meaning, may shift as well.
If this is true, ex post judgments are unavoidable.  A form of the old art
of casuistry therefore  emerges  as an important  aspect of the law of rules.
102.  See HkT, supra note 25,  at 246-48  (rejecting "plain fact"  positivism).
103.  A  prominent  positivist  makes  this very  point.  See,  e.g.,  RAz,  supra note  47,  at 48-49
(describing role of both legal and moral reasoning);  RAz, supra note 22, at 310-24 (acknowledging the
moral content  of legal arguments).
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B.  Substantive Ex Post Judgments Everywhere?  The Problem of the
Single Exception
If  contests  over  substance  are  unavoidable,  the  project  of  rule-
following  and  (a  certain understanding  of)  the rule of law may well  seem
threatened.'I  At least this is so if such contests involve moral and political
issues in particular cases, for when they do, the meaning of the rule is deter-
mined by moral  and political judgments  at the point of application.
Let us turn  to an  example,  designed  to demonstrate  the likely role of
casuistry in a regime  of rules, brought about  by what might be called  the
problem of the single exception.  Language will never,  or almost never, be
interpreted  so  as to  apply in ways that would  produce  absurdity  or  gross
injustice.  There  is  an  old  maxim  from  Chief  Justice  Coke:  Cessante
ratione, cessat ipsa lex. 1 05  Suppose, for example, that a law forbids people
from  driving  over fifty-five  miles per  hour on a certain  street.  Jones  goes
seventy-five  miles  per  hour  because  he  is  driving  an  ambulance,  with  a
comatose accident victim, to the hospital;  Smith goes ninety because she is
a police officer following a fleeing felon; Wilson goes eighty because he is
being chased by a madman with  a gun.  In all these cases, the driver may
well  have  a  legally  acceptable  excuse,  even  if there  is  no  law  "on  the
books"  explicitly  allowing  an  exception  in these  circumstances.  If rules
have exceptions  in cases of palpable absurdity or injustice, 1 06 the  denial of
an exception depends  on a moral or political judgment to the effect that the
particular result is not palpably absurd  or unjust.  Here is the central  point:
once it is decided that a single exception  will be allowed,  it is always open,
in  principle,  to  decide  that  another  exception  should  be  made  too.  The
refusal to make  a further exception is based on a form of casuistry, finding
the proposed further exception to be distinguishable  from the previous case
in which an exception has been made.  Hence the line between case-by-case
judgments  and rule-following  becomes  thin in principle.1
0 7
Consider  a  real  case,  that  of Church of the Holy Trinity v.  United
States.  ' 08  In that case the Court held that it was acceptable for a church to
pay for the transportation to the United  States of a rector, notwithstanding  a
104.  See HAYEK,  ROAD TO SERmOM,  supra note  12, at 72 ("Stripped of all technicalities,  [the Rule
of Law]  means  that government  in all  its  actions  is bound by rules  fixed and announced  beforehand
105.  P.S.  ATrYnA  & RoBaRT  S.  SuMMERs,  FoRm  AND SutsrANcE IN  ANGLO-AMEPiCAN  LAW  89
(1987).
106.  Presumptions  against absurdity appear in virtually all  legal systems.  See Massimo La Torre et
al.,  Statutory Interpretation in Italy, in  INTERPRETNG  STATuEs  213,  222  (D.  Neil  MacCormick  &
Robert S.  Summers  eds.,  1991); Zenon Bankowski & D. Neil  MaeCormick, Statutory Interpretation  in
the United  Kingdom, in INTERPRtErn.J  STATuTEs 359, 373  (D. Neil MaeCormick  & Robert  S. Summers
eds.,  1991);  Robert  S.  Summers  & Michelle  Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis,  in
INTERPRETnIN  STATuES  461, 485  (D. Neil MaeCormick  & Robert  S. Summers eds.,  1991)  (Germany);
id. ("virtually every system in our study").
107.  See  HART, supra note 25,  at  127.
108.  143  U.S. 457 (1892).
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flat  statutory ban  on  any  employer payment  for the  importation  into  the
United States of any employee.1 0 9  The Court held that the statute, despite
its language,  should not apply to churches,  because  that application  would
be unreasonable  and was not likely intended.110  But what if a further case
arose involving a hospital paying the travel expenses of a doctor, or a uni-
versity paying  the travel  expenses  of a  scientist,  or  a charity  paying  the
expenses  of an expert  on relief of poverty?  If an exception would not be
made in those cases  as well, it would not be because of the literal language
of  the  statutory  "rule"--the  issue  of  literalism  was  settled  by  Holy
Trinity-but because the  argument  for an  exception  would be found less
plausible in those cases than in the church case.  The strength of the claim
for an exception cannot depend on anything other than social judgments and
understandings.  Certainly we can imagine a culture in which the absurdity
of the application  would  be  greater  for a  hospital  than  for  a  church,  or
greater for a charity than for anything else.  And on this score, we can imag-
ine changes  across space  and time, as different social judgments enter into
assessments  of absurdity.
In an  especially  illuminating  discussion  of the  virtues  and  vices  of
rules,  Frederick  Schauer  argues  for  "presumptive  positivism,"  in  which
interpreters  take rules in their literal meaning  except in the most absurd or
unreasonable  cases."'  The  argument  is  plausible  under  imaginable
assumptions, 12  but notice that there  is a large  difference between  literal
interpretation and presumptive positivism, since the latter calls for a form of
casuistry, in which interpreters are always faced with the question:  "Is this
application bizarre?"  The change from literalism to presumptive literalism
is a  change  from rule-bound  decisions  to a species  of case-by-case judg-
ment, though it is a distinctive  species to be sure.
In short,  the mere possibility  of an  exception  or  an excuse  in all or
almost all cases involving rules-excuses found through a familiar interpre-
tive route-means  that there is a possibility of an exception  or an  excuse
everywhere,  or  almost  everywhere.  It  means  that  even  the  most  well-
specified rules do not offer a full ex ante specification of legal rights.  When
an excuse is found insufficient-when in the speed limit case, Collins is not
allowed  an exemption merely because he was late for work-it is not only
because  of the text, but also because  of some judgment  (usually tacit and
rarely made  in advance  of the actual  case) whether  the application  of the
statute  is absurd or grossly unjust.
109.  Id. at 472.
110.  Id.
111.  ScHAnurt, supra note 37,  at 196-206.
112.  We would have  to know  something  about  the  capacities  of rulemakers  and  interpreters;  if
rulemakers  do  their job  fairly  well,  and  correct  silly  rules,  the  case  for  literal  interpretation  is
strengthened;  so too if the interpreters are unreliable.  See infra notes  230-232 and accompanying text.
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My  conclusion  is that when  the  interpretation  of rules  seems  not  to
involve  substantive  ex post judgments, an ex post judgment is really being
made to the effect that the application is not bizarre or unjust.  Judgments of
this kind are usually tacit and obvious-usually  so extremely obvious  that
they take place very quickly and do not appear to be judgments at all.  But
they are nonetheless  ex post judgments.
We can go further.  In  cases decided  under rules,  courts  also engage,
much of the time, in  a form of analogical  reasoning.  This is  a counterin-
tuitive claim.  Interpretation of rules is often said to be at an opposite pole
from analogical  reasoning.  Of course,  common  law courts engage  in ana-
logical thinking, dealing with precedents, but-it is often  said-judges do
nothing of the kind when they deal with statutes.  This opposition is far too
simple.  Often interpretation  of rules involves analogy,  too." 3  In this way,
we might try to vindicate Justice Holmes'  emphasis on the interpretation of
rules  through  examination  of "the  picture"  that the  words  "evoke  in  the
common mind.""' 4
Some  intriguing  work  in  cognitive  psychology  tends  to  support
Holmes'  suggestion.  Suppose  that we have  a single class of things:  birds,
or vehicles,  or nations,  or  works of art,  or mammals.  How  do  we know
whether members of a single class are alike or different?  It turns out that
people generally have a mental picture of a model or typical example of the
category,  and  they then reason  analogically,  asking  whether a member  of
the class is "like" or "unlike" the model or typical example. 5 1 5  Thus people
tend to think that a canary  is more  "bird"  than a penguin, though both are
birds;  a truck is more  "vehicle"  than an  elevator;  an apple  is more  "fruit"
than a coconut.  Experiments show "the robust psychological reality of the
typicality of a single exemplar of a given class ....  The typicality  of an
exemplar  is then routinely measured  by the distance between the exemplar
and the class as a whole."'"
16
113.  Hart  makes the same point in his discussion of the distinction between law via examples  and
law via rules.  See  HART, supra note 25,  127-29.  Consider  especially this suggestion:
[T]he  authoritative  general  language  in  which  a  rule  is  expressed  may  guide  only  in  an
uncertain way much as an authoritative example does.  The sense that the language of the rule
will  enable  us  simply to  pick  out  easily  recognizable  instances,  at this  point  gives  way;
subsumption and the drawing of a syllogistic conclusion no longer characterize  the nerve  of
the reasoning involved in determining what is the right thing to do.  Instead,  the  language of
the rule seems now only to mark out an authoritative example, namely that constituted by the
plain case.  This may be used in much the same way as a precedent  ....  [A]II  that the person
called  upon to  answer  can  do  is to  consider  (as  does  one  who makes  use  of a precedent)
whether  the present case  resembles the  plain case "sufficiently"  in "relevant"  respects.
Id. at 127.
114.  See  McBoyle  v.  United  States,  283  U.S.  25,  27  (1931).  Cf  LUDwIG  WIrrGsrEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL  INvEsnGATIONs  83 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1971)  ("But if a person has not yet
got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice.  -And  when
I do  this  I do not communicate  less to him than  I know  myself.")
115.  I borrow here from the discussion  in MASSIMO  PIATTELLI-PALMERINI,  INEVITABLE  ILLUSIONS
147-58  (1994).
116.  Id. at  152.
[Vol. 83:953PROBLEMS WITH RULES
What these  experiments reveal  is that categories  receive their human
meaning  by reference to typical  instances.  When we are  asked whether  a
particular thing falls within  a  general  category, we  examine whether that
thing is  like  or  unlike  the typical  or  defining  instances.  Very  much the
same  is  true  in  the  interpretation  of rules.  The  process  of  examining
whether  an  application is  absurd  or unjust  occurs through  seeing whether
the application is fundamentally different from the core or defining applica-
tions;  consider  the  speed  limit  and Holy  Trinity cases  discussed  above.
When there is a fundamental difference, the case at hand is declared dissim-
ilar, and the rule does not apply.  In subsequent cases the judgment will turn
on whether the new instance is similar to the defining or core applications,
or  similar  instead  to  the  case  previously  found  dissimilar  to  those
applications.
Turn  now  to  a case  that involves  more  than  one  rule.  Suppose the
Supreme Court says that in the face of interpretive doubt, statutes should be
construed so as not to apply outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States," 7  and also that in the face of interpretive doubt, statutes should be
interpreted  with  deference  to  the  views  of  the  administrative  agency
charged  with enforcing  them." 8  Suppose  that a case  arises  in which the
agency  charged  with  enforcing  a  civil rights  law  concludes  that the  law
applies outside the United States.  What should a court do when faced with
interpretive  rules  that conflict?  A  legal  system may  contain  no  rule-like
answer to this question. If it does not, disputes will break out at the point of
application, when judges exercise discretion  so as to accommodate the two
rules, or to develop principles for harmonizing them.  Ifjudges or others are
concerned to ensure that the system really is one of rules, they may come up
with rules  of priority,  so  that  conflicts  between  rules  can  be resolved by
reference to rules.  But the rules of priority will not always be identified in
advance.  At least in some cases, they will have to be settled at the point of
application.
In short:  We should acknowledge  that the meaning of rules is a prod-
uct of substantive, ex post judgments, often at least partly political or moral
in character.  This point seems  decisive against approaches  that insist that
from the internal point of view, it is possible to say what the law is without
making  some judgments  at the  point  of application  about  what the  law
should be.
117.  See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,  499 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1991)  (holding that Title VII does
not apply  when U.S.  firms employ  American citizens abroad).
118.  See,  e.g.,  Sullivan  v.  Everhart,  494  U.S.  83,  89  (1990);  Chevron  U.S.A.,  Inc.  v. National
Resources  Defense Council,  Inc.,  467 U.S. 837, 843  (1984)  (holding that when congressional  intent is
unclear,  courts must  interpret  statutes  in  accordance with  "permissible"  interpretations  of the agency
charged with enforcement).
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C.  The Rule of  Law Chastened but Mostly Intact
How damaging  are these expost judgments to the project of following
rules, or to the rule of law?  They are not as damaging  as they might seem.
Almost all real-world  cases  involving  the meaning  of rules  are  very
easy.  Although they are contestable, the ex post substantive judgments that
underlie readings of rules are often widely shared, or at least supported by
good reasons  even  if not widely shared.  Usually the literal application  of
statutory  language  does not produce  absurdity. 1 9  Rules  of priority,  laid
down ex ante, are sometimes available when more than  one rule applies.'
2 0
These  refinements  are  enough  to  allow  the  rule of  law  to  survive  as  a
project.
It is often feasible  to rely on the literal or dictionary definition of legal
terms, and courts could do this even when  such reliance leads to apparently
unreasonable  applications.121  Probably  we must acknowledge that a good
legal system will allow exceptions  in cases  of absurdity or gross  injustice,
and it is revealing that virtually all legal systems do this.' 22  But it is also
feasible not to allow exceptions, and the category of exceptions, if it exists,
might be reserved for the most bizarre cases.' 13  Literalism or presumptive
literalism might be urged for pragmatic purposes-indeed  for some of the
same  pragmatic  reasons  that support  rule-ness  in general-as a means  of
promoting  predictability  and  limiting judicial  discretion  at  the  point  of
application.  Whether  those  reasons  are  persuasive  depends  on  the
context.' 24
If officials cannot look into the reasonableness of the application, some
unfortunate  results will follow in particular cases,2 5  but we might believe
that the results will be superior, in the aggregate, to those that would follow
from  allowing  officials  to apply rules  literally only  in  cases  in which  the
application makes sense.  We might distrust a situation in which judges felt
free to  explore  the justification  for the rule and the reasonableness  of the
application when  deciding whether to apply the rule.
Read literally,  rules are generally  overinclusive  and  underinclusive  if
assessed by reference to their purposes.  There is always a gap between the
justification for a rule-usually taking the form of a standard-and the rule
119.  This is a  central  point in  Schauer's  endorsement of presumptive positivism.  See  SCHAUER,
supra note  37, at 202-03.
120.  See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown  Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,213 (1988)  (holding that statutory
grants  of rule-making  authority  do not  include  the power  to make  retroactive  rules,  absent  express
authorization).  In  Bowen,  the  principle  of deference  to  agency  interpretations  was  trumped  by  the
principle of non-retroactivity.
121.  See SciHutR, supra note 37, at 205 (advocating  adherence to the  literal meaning of a rule's
language unless the  result is "egregiously  at odds" with common  sense moral judgments).
122.  See Summers & Taruffo, supra note  106,  at 485.
123.  See  ScHAtuER, supra note 37,  at 205.
124.  See infra notes  130-141  and accompanying  text.
125.  A vivid  discussion  appears  in  PmL.ip  K.  HowARD,  THE  DEATH  OF  COMMON  SENSE  1-53
(1994).
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itself.  Indeed,  there is a plurality of possible descriptions  of justifications
for every rule, with some very  specific (banning vehicles  from the park "to
ensure  that the park  is  quiet")  and  some  very  general  (banning vehicles
from the park "to  make the world better").  The  gap between justification
and rule is part of a familiar argument against rules, and perhaps  an argu-
ment for an  approach to rule-following  that allows  exceptions  in cases  of
absurdity  or injustice.  But  it is  not an  argument that literal readings  are
infeasible.126  Hart's argument about the "open texture" of language seems
too rapid insofar as it fails to recognize  the possibility of literalism  as  an
interpretive  strategy  even  when  aims  are  indeterminate  and  situations
unforeseen. 127
Whether  literal  readings,  when feasible,  are reasonable  or  right  is  a
complex issue, having to do with our faith in interpreters, our faith in those
who make rules in the first place, the aggregate risk of error, and the possi-
bility of legislative  corrections of absurd results  in particular cases.'12  The
choice  between  literal  meanings  and  exceptions  for  absurdity  is  itself a
decision about the appropriate nature of law.  But this is not a point about
feasibility.
We  have  concluded,  then, that  rules  cannot  be  interpreted  without
shared understandings  of various sorts, and without resort to substantive  ex
post arguments  of certain kinds.  We have concluded  as well that a degree
of law-making  power in the form of casuistry  is exercised  at the point of
application, at least in a system in which literal language will not be under-
stood to produce absurdity or gross injustice.  In this way the case for rules
must be chastened and sometimes cautious.  Whether rule-bound decisions
are preferable  to the alternatives  is  another  question;  it is to that question
that I now turn.
VII
AGAINST  RULES,  II: ARE  RULES  OBTUSE?
In many spheres, people  do not rely  on rules  at all.  A rule-book for
telling jokes would not be all that helpful:  maybe people who rely on such
books  are funnier than they would  otherwise be, but if you really tried to
tell  jokes  by following  clear  rules  laid  down  in  advance,  you  probably
would not be very funny.  There are no clear rules for dealing with friends
in distress.  Doctors are familiarly said to follow rules, and surely they often
do,  but some  illuminating  accounts  treat  medicine  as  largely  a  matter  of
casuistry, in which experienced people do not follow rules, but instead build
up judgments  analogically and from experience  with past cases.  They rely
126.  See  ScHAtuR, supra note 37,  at 214.
127.  See  HART,  supra note 25,  at 128-36.
128.  See infra notes  191-194 and  accompanying  text.
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on "rules of thumb" rather than mandatory rules.' 2 9  They make judgments
at the point of application.
A.  Rules Are Both Overinclusive and Underinclusive if Assessed by
Reference to  the Reasons that Justify Them
The first problem with rules is that it can be very hard to design good
ones.  In many areas, people lack enough information to produce rules that
will yield  sufficiently accurate  results.  Consider, for example,  the regula-
tion of cyberspace.  Many  observers  and participants  think that it is prema-
ture for Congress to design rules for this activity,  and that it would  be far
better to rely on common law methods  of case-by-case judgment  and anal-
ogy.130  Production of rules entails high ex ante investment  of political and
informational  costs.  Sometimes  those  costs  are  too  high  for  lawmakers,
who  do not know enough to produce good rules,  and  for affected  persons,
who would be faced with excessive  rigidity.' 31
Now suppose that a rule is in place.  If strictly followed, the rule will
often produce arbitrariness and errors in particular cases.  As we have seen,
the justifications  that  underlie  the  rule  will  not  support  all  instances  to
which the rule applies by its terms.' 32  More generally, experience will turn
up considerations or contexts that make it odd or worse to apply the rule. 33
For  this  reason it is  sometimes  inefficient 34  to  make  decisions  by rule,
because  any  rule  that  people  can  generate  will  produce  too  much
inaccuracy.
Consider,  for  example,  the  case  of  college  admissions.  We  might
think that any simple rule would produce too many errors from the stand-
point  of  the  goal  of  obtaining  a  good  student  body.  Even  a  complex
formula,  allowing  several  factors  to  count  but  also  weighting  them  and
hence  minimizing  discretion,  might produce  many  mistakes.  Consider  as
well the social security  grid 35 which is  sometimes said to produce  exces-
sive  generalization,
136  giving  rise  to  conspicuous  injustice  in  individual
129.  See generally KATRYN  M.  HUNTER,  DocToRS'  STOras:  THE  NA  InvE  STRcrutU  OF
MEDICAL  KNoWxLaoME  (1991).
130.  See generally  Lawrence  Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104  YALE L.J.  1743  (1995).
131.  See  KAPLOW,  supra note  24, at 591  (noting that "a  rule is more costly to promulgate than  a
standard of the same degree of complexity.").
132.  See supra notes  104-112 and  accompanying  text.
133.  See, e.g.,  Donald  C.  Langevoort,  Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal  Banking Regulation, 85  MICH.  L. REv.  673,  719-29  (1987)
(arguing  that rules  limiting the power of banks to  form branches and  deal in  securities  have become
obsolete).
134.  I use here  the  Kaldor-Hicks  understanding  of efficiency.  See  RICHARD  POSNER,  ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS  OF LAW  13-16 (4th ed.  1992).
135.  See  20  C.F.R.  pt.  404,  subpt.  P,  app.  2,  tbl.  1  (1994)  ("Residual  Functional  Capacity:
Maximum  Sustained  Work Capability  Limited  to  Sedentary  Work  as  a  Result  of Severe  Medically
Determinable  Impairment(s)").
136.  See the discussion of arguments both ways in JERRY L. MASHAW,  BUREAUCRATIC  JUSTICE 87-
88,  117-20  (1983).  Mashaw  notes  that the  social  security  disability  grid has  been  criticized  for  its
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cases.  At least in principle, it is possible that the aggregate error rate would
be lower with individualized  decisions.  Or consider the matter of criminal
sentencing.  While  open-ended  discretion  has  been  persuasively  criti-
cized,137 it seems clear that the range of relevant variables is very wide and
that rigidly rule-bound decisions could produce much error and injustice.
1 31
In modem regulatory  law, this problem is  associated  with the perva-
sive  phenomenon  of  "site-level  unreasonableness."' 39  This  phenomenon
occurs when  a general  rule is  applied to  situations  in  which it makes no
sense.  Consider a requirement that all eating places have two fire exits, or
that all places of employment be equipped with ramps as well as staircases,
or that all pollution  sources use certain  expensive  antipollution devices.' 40
The general rule can produce enormous costs for few benefits in the particu-
lar  site  or  in  many  particular  sites;  yet  administrators  often  insist  on
mechanical  compliance  with the general rule.  Perhaps it would be best to
dispense with rules and instead to allow firms  to comply by showing ade-
quate performance under a set of factors, a process to be overseen by flexi-
ble inspectors.'
41
B.  Rules Can Be  Outrun by Changing Circumstances
Rules  are often shown to be perverse  through new developments  that
make them anachronistic.' 42  Those  who issue a rule  cannot know the full
range of situations to which the rule will be applied, and in the new circum-
stances, the rule may be  hopelessly outmoded.  Consider the regulation  of
banking  and  telecommunications.  With  the  development  of  automated
teller machines, prohibitions  on branch banking make absolutely no sense;
with the rise of cable television, a regulatory  framework designed for three
television  networks  is  built  on  wildly  false  assumptions. 143  Even  well-
designed rules in the  1970s may be utterly inadequate for the  1990s.  In the
"irrational  overgeneralizations."  Id. at 87.  See also Itzhak  Gilboa  & David  Sehmeidler,  Case-Based
Decision Theory, 110  Q.J. ECONOMICS  605  (1995).
137.  See,  e.g.,  Albert  W.  Alschuler,  The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A  Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58  U. Cin. L. REV.  901,  901  (1991);  Daniel J.  Freed, Federal  Sentencing in the Wake of
the Guidelines: Unacceptable  Limits on the Discretion  of Sentencers, 101  YALE Li. 1681,  1685  (1992).
138.  See, e.g.,  Alschuler, supra note  137,  at 902 (arguing that the move away from individualized
sentences that has taken place is "worse than sentencing disparity");  Freed, supra note  137, at 1683-84
(arguing that the current guidelines  system leaves the judge tom between "allegiance  to rigid rules and
an urge to do justice  in individual  cases").
139.  See EUGENE  BARDACH  & ROBERT  A.  KAGAN,  GOING  BY  THE BOOK 7 (1982).
140.  Many more  examples  could  be added.  See  HowARD,  supra note  125,  at 12-22  (discussing
OSHA, the FAA, and other regulatory regimes).
141.  See id. at  175-77.  Consider  also  the  endorsement  of performance  standards  over  design
standards  in Executive Order  No. 12,866,  discussed in Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 55.
142.  See Larry Lessig, Fidelity  in Translation,  71 Tax. L. Rav.  1165,  1174-82  (1993)  (discussing
the  problem  of interpreting  old  texts  in  light  of  a  new  context  and  the  possibility  of  faithful
interpretations  that engage  in acts of translation);  see generally Langevoort,  supra note  133.
143.  For a  criticism of the current  regulatory regime as  applied to television today, see generally
THOMAS G.  KRATrENmAKER &  LUCAS A. Po\W,  JR.,  REGULATING  ELECTRONIC  BROADCASTING  (1994);
see also BRUcE  M. OWEN  & STaEw  S.  WILDMAN, Vmo ECONOMICS  16-18 (1992).
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face of rapidly changing technology, current rules for regulation of telecom-
munications will become ill-suited to future markets.  For this reason it may
be best to avoid rules altogether, or at least to create only a few simple rules
that allow room for private adaptation.  Some rules can harness the informa-
tional advantages  of private  actors and thus diminish the problem of obso-
lescence.  Of course, sometimes changed circumstances  might be irrelevant,
especially  under well-designed rules.'"
An argument  for rules  is  that they provide fixity  and  allow  stability
even when  circumstances  have  changed.145  A  legal  system that  changes
whenever circumstances have changed may give too much room for discre-
tion and  allow too little in the way of predictability.  But it is sufficient for
present purposes to say that rules may badly misfire under new conditions,
and that  sometimes  this  is  an  argument  against  rules,  or  at least  against
certain kinds of rules.'46  Similarly, courts that proceed  casuistically might
allow the democratic  process  large room for deliberation  and evaluation.
C.  Abstraction and Generality Sometimes Mask Bias
When  people  are  differently  situated,  it may  be  unfair or otherwise
wrong to treat them the same, that is, to apply the identical rule to them.  If
the rule  is  that everyone  must  use stairs,  people  in wheelchairs  will face
special disadvantages.  If a rule says that everyone must pay to enter muse-
ums, people without money will be unable to go to museums.  If a rule says
that  every  employee  must  lack  the  capacity  to become  pregnant,  many
women will be  frozen out of the workforce.147
By ignoring special circumstances, general rules can harm or discrimi-
nate against identifiable groups  with  distinctive  characteristics,  and  in that
sense  reflect  bias despite  or  even because  of their  generality.  A  familiar
understanding  of equality requires  the similarly  situated to be treated  the
same;  a less  familiar but also important understanding  requires  the  differ-
ently  situated  to  be  treated  differently,  also  in  the  interest  of equality.
General rules might produce inequality to the extent that they do not allow
people to speak of relevant differences.
D.  Rules Drive Discretion Underground
When rules yield a good deal of inaccuracy in particular cases, people
in a position of authority may simply ignore them.  Discretion  is exercised
through a mild form of civil disobedience, and this is hard to police or even
144.  See  infra text  accompanying  notes  252-263  for  a  discussion of a  kind  of rule  system  that
allows evolution  with changing circumstances,  as through privately adaptable  rules.  See also RICHARD
A. EPsrEIN,  SIMPLE  RuLES  FOR  A  COMPLEX  WoR.LD  (1995).
145.  See supra text accompanying  note  56.
146.  Privately adaptable  rules can reduce  the relevant risks. See infra Part  X.D.
147.  For an  illuminating  discussion  of human  differences  and  capabilities,  see  AMARTYA  SEN,
INEQUALITY  REEXAMINED  79-87 (1992).  See also CArHAINE  A. MACKmNoN,  FEMINISM  UNMODIFIED
32-45 (1987)  (discussing how rules based  on biased norms may produce  or ratify  inequality).
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to  see.  Thus  in Woodson v. North Carolina," 14  the Court invalidated  the
mandatory  death penalty not only  on the  ground  that it was  excessively
rule-bound, 1 4 9 but also on the ground that it was too discretionary since the
mandatory  rule  could  not  possibly be  mandatory  in  practice.'50  In fact
juries would refuse to sentence  people to death, but for reasons that would
not be visible  and accessible.
"Jury  nullification"  of broad  and rigid rules  is  a  familiar  and  often
celebrated  phenomenon. 5'  Similarly, administrative  agencies  can simply
refuse  to  enforce  statutes  when  they  are  too  rule-like  in nature.  1 2  For
example,  the Clean Air Act's severe  sanctions for listed pollutants, operat-
ing in rule-like fashion,  led the Environmental  Protection Agency  to stop
listing pollutants  at  all.' 5 3  Thus  "the  act's  absolute  duties  to respond  to
danger prompted officials not to recognize the dangers in the first place."'54
E.  Rules Allow Evasion by Wrongdoers
Conduct that is harmful, and that would be banned in an optimal  sys-
tem,  will  be  allowed  under  most  imaginable  rules,  because  it is  hard to
design rules that ban all conduct that ought to be prohibited.  Because rules
have clear edges,  they allow people  to "evade"  them by engaging in con-
duct  that is technically  exempted  but that creates  the same  or  analogous
harms.  Rules, in short, are under-inclusive  as well as over-inclusive if  mea-
sured by reference to their background justifications.  If  judges  cannot pro-
ceed by analogy,  and extend the rule where  the justification  so  suggests,
people will be able to engage in harmful conduct because of a mere techni-
cality.  This  is another possible source  of inefficiency through rules.
F.  Rules Can Be Dehumanizing and Procedurally Unfair; Sometimes It
Is Necessary or Appropriate to Seek Individualized Tailoring
A  familiar  conception  of procedural  justice-embodied  in the  Due
Process Clause-grants people a hearing  in order to show that a statute  or
regulation  has been  accurately  applied.  Thus,  for  example,  the  Supreme
Court has held that someone who is deprived of welfare benefits has a right
to a hearing  to contest  the legitimacy  of the  deprivation. 155  This  under-
standing of due process fits well with a system of rules.  The whole point of
148.  428 U.S. 280 (1976).
149.  Id. at 302-03.
150.  Id.
151.  I discuss legitimate rule revision infra at Part X.B.
152.  See  DAVID  SCHOENBROD,  POWER WrriouT  RESPONSIBILITY  75-76  (1993);  cf.  JOHN  M.
MENDELOFF,  THE  D  mmA  OF Toxic Suts;TANcE  REGULATION 53-71 (1988)  (discussing OSHA and the
problem of underregulation  under draconian  statutory standards).
153.  See ScHoENROD,  supra note 152, at 76.
154.  Id.
155.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397  U.S. 254, 270 (1970)  (holding that "[w]elfare  recipients must...  be
given an  opportunity to confront  and cross-examine  the witnesses  relied on by the department').
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the  hearing  is  to  see  whether  the rule  has  been  accurately  applied.  The
hearing  fortifies the rule.
But  another  conception  of due  process  urges  that people  should  be
allowed not merely  to test the application of law to  fact, but also  to urge
that their case is different from those that have gone before,  and that some-
one in a position of authority ought to be required to pay heed to the partic-
ulars of their situation. 156  On this view, people affected by the law ought to
be permitted to participate  in the formulation of the very rule (or standard)
to  be  applied  to their  case.  This  conception  has  conspicuous  democratic
features  insofar  as it  embodies norms of participation and responsiveness.
In this way the old art of casuistry might be given democratic  foundations.
Affected  citizens might be  permitted to offer the particulars  of their  case
and to demand a particularized response.  On the other hand, the process  of
representation is different at the law-application  stage from what it is at the
lawmaking stage, with far broader participation  at the point of lawmaking.
VIII
RuLELESSNESS:  USING  FACTORS
When  a rule fails, a judge may rely on a standard or may instead use
the process of analogy, which does not tell us in advance  whether we will
have a rule,  a standard,  or  something  else.  Judges  and  others  who  reject
rules may also rely on a set of factors,  and I will discuss judgments  based
on factors as a useful way to approach and evaluate rulelessness.  Like anal-
ogies, guidelines, and standards, factors reveal some of the vices and virtues
of rulelessness;  in their  opposition  to  rules,  they  overlap  with judgments
based on standards or analogies.  But judgments based on factors have some
distinctive  features as well,  and these are of independent interest.
The line between rules and  factors is one  of degree rather than one  of
kind.  It should now be clear that rules are rarely or never unbending;  it is
best to speak of degrees of rule-ness rather than of rules or not.  Similarly,
factors  are not open-ended  grants  of discretion.  We  can be clearer  about
decision-making  by factors  after exploring a few examples,  and also  after
seeing why a system of factors is often thought to be a superior method  of
decision-required,  sometimes,  by the  Constitution  itself.  The  law  gov-
erning the death penalty is the  best place to start.
156.  This  is  the  conception  of procedural  fairness  embodied  in  the rejection  of the  short-lived
"irrebuttable  presumption"  doctrine.  See  Cleveland  Bd.  of Educ.  v.  LaFleur, 414  U.S.  632,  639-48
(1974)  (holding  that  an  irrebuttable  presumption  of  pregnant  woman's  unfitness  to  teach  after  a
predetermined  month  in  her  pregnancy  is  irrational);  see  also  Laurence  H.  Tribe,  Structural Due
Process, 10  HARv.  C.R.-C.L.  L.  REv.  269,  285-86  (1975)  (evaluating  the  irrebuttable  presumption
doctrine).
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A.  Examples
In Furman v.  Georgia,' 57  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  a  rule-free
death penalty  violated the Due  Process  Clause not because  it was  exces-
sively  barbaric  for  the  state  to  take  life, but  because  the  states  allowed
undue  discretion  in the infliction  of the ultimate penalty of death.158  The
problem with the pre-1970  death penalty was procedural,  in the sense that
states  did  not limit the  discretion  of juries  in  deciding  who  deserved  to
die.1
59
North Carolina responded to Furman by enacting a "mandatory"  death
penalty,  eliminating  judge  and jury  discretion. 60  Under North  Carolina
law, a mandatory death penalty was to be imposed for a specified category
of homicide offenses.  No judge and no jury would have discretion to sub-
stitute life imprisonment in cases falling within that category.  No judge and
no jury would have discretion to decide who would live and who would die.
In this way, North Carolina attempted to apply sharp rule-of-law constraints
to the area of death  sentencing.
In  Woodson  v.  North Carolina,6'  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  a
mandatory  death  sentence  was  unconstitutional  because it was  a  rule.
Invoking  the need  for  individuation,  the  Court  said  that  "[t]he  belief no
longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identi-
cal  punishment  without regard  to the past  life  and  habits  of a particular
offender."' 62  According  to  the  Supreme  Court,  a  serious  constitutional
shortcoming of the mandatory  death  sentence is that it:
fail[s]  to allow the particularized  consideration of relevant aspects
of the character  and record of each convicted defendant before the
imposition upon  him  of a sentence  of death.  . . .A  process  that
accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record
of the  individual  offender  or  the  circumstances  of the  particular
offense excludes  from consideration  in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate  or mitigating factors
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.  It treats all per-
sons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated  mass
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.'63
What ultimately  emerged  from  Woodson  is  a  system  in  which  the
death penalty  is  generally  decided  through the  consideration  of  a set  of
157.  408  U.S.  238 (1972)  (per curiam).
158.  The opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart and White, which were critical to the 5-4 outcome,
stress this point.  Id. at 248 n.1 1 (Douglas, J.,  concurring);  id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,  concurring); id. at
311-14  (White,  J.,  concurring).
159.  See id. at 309-10  (Stewart J., concurring);  id. at 311-13  (White, J,  concurring).
160.  See  Woodson v. North  Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285-86  (1976).
161.  Id.
162.  Id. at 296-97  (quoting Williams v. New York, 337  U.S. 241,  247  (1949)).
163.  Id. at 303-04 (emphasis  added).
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specified  factors,  in  the  form  of  aggravating  and  mitigating  circum-
stances."6  It is this system of capital sentencing that, in the current Court's
view,  walks  the  constitutionally  tolerable  line  between  unacceptably
mandatory rules  and unacceptably  broad  discretion.  Of course  some jus-
tices, most recently  Justice  Blackmun,'65  have  contended  that the line  is
impossibly thin-that there is no conceivable  system of capital sentencing
that  adequately  combines  the  virtues  of  individualized  consideration,
required  by  Woodson,  with  the virtues  of non-arbitrary  decision-making,
required  by Furman. 
6 6
Woodson arose in an especially  dramatic  setting, but the Court's pre-
ferred method-factors rather than rules-can be found in many areas.  For
example,  the Court has offered no rules for deciding how much in the way
of procedure  is required  before  the  state may take  liberty  or property) 67
Any "rules," the Court suggests, would be too inaccurate and too insensitive
to  individual  circumstance.168 Instead the Court requires  an assessment  of
three factors:  the nature  and weight of the individual interest  at stake;  the
likelihood of an erroneous  determination  and  the probable value  of addi-
tional  safeguards;  and  the nature  and  strength  of the government's  inter-
est.' 69  This  somewhat open-ended  multifactor  test is quite  different  from
what  is  anticipated  by  some conceptions  of the  rule  of law.  It  sacrifices
predictability for the sake of accuracy in individual cases.  This is a perva-
sive choice  in the American  legal  system.
17 0
B.  Factors Without Rules
What are the features of a system based on factors?
1.  Multiple and  Diverse Relevant Criteria
It is obvious that in a system of factors,  decisions are based on multi-
ple and  diverse  criteria.  No simple  rule  or principle  can be  successfully
applied to the case.
2.  Difficulty of Describing  Relevant Factors Ex Ante
In a system of factors,  it  is often  impossible  to describe  in advance
exactly what is relevant.  People know too little to be able to say.  Because
of the informational  burdens faced by those  who  lay down the list of fac-
tors, two outcomes  are likely.  First, the relevant terms,  as they are identi-
164.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.  153,  192-95  (1976).
165.  See Callins v. Collins,  114  S.  Ct.  1127,  1136-37  (1994)  (Blackmun,  J.,  dissenting); see also
Godfrey  v. Georgia, 446 U.S.  420,  437-42 (1980)  (Marshall,  J., concurring).
166.  I try to  defend this view  infra at  Part X.D.
167.  See Mathews  v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,  334-35  (1976).
168.  See id.
169.  Id. at 335.
170.  A 1995  LEXIS search of the headings and text of the United States Code produced over 1000
references to  "factors."  See, e.g.,  2 U.S.C. § 117e(2)  (1994).
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fled in advance, may be too general and abstract to contain sharp limits on
what can be considered.  The legal terms  are exhaustive but vague.  They
have to be specified  to be  made  operational,  and it is in the  specification
that  a  more  complete  account  will  be  provided.  The  specification  is
unlikely to preclude  other possible  specifications in other  settings.  A  sig-
nificant degree of law-making  power can be found at the point of applica-
tion.  Consider,  for  example,  a  law  that  forbids  "unreasonable  risk,"
specifying  some  but  not  all  of  the  ingredients  of  judgments  about
reasonableness.
171
The second  possibility  is that the relevant  factors  will  be listed  at a
high level of specificity, but there will be some proviso at the end, includ-
ing, for  example,  "such  other  factors  as  are  deemed relevant"-to  show
awareness that new and relevant factors may come up.172  The legal terms
are  specific but nonexhaustive.  Both of these  strategies  are  pervasive  in
American  law.' 73
3.  Absence of a Clear, A Priori Sense of the Weight of the Criteria
It is typical of a system of factors that the relevant criteria cannot be
assigned  weights  in  advance.  In  deciding  how  much  of a  hearing  is
required before  someone  may be deprived of something, for example,  we
do not know how much weight to give to the government interest in effi-
ciency, or how much weight to assign to the individual interest in ensuring
against  mistaken  deprivations.174  Answers  to  questions  of  weight  are
offered in the context of concrete  controversies.  As we will  soon see, this
notion is related to the problem of incommensurability.
4.  Attentiveness to (Much oJ) the Whole Situation
The rule of law is abstract in the  sense that it attends to only  a small
part of a complex  situation.  If people  are admitted to college only on the
basis of test scores, we have  a rule.  (I put to  one side the case of complex
rules  or  formulas.)175  But  a system  of factors  tends  to look  closely  at a
wide  range of particulars.  In the college  admission  setting, for  example,
officials might examine not just test scores, but also grades, extracurricular
activities, family background, geography, race, gender, and much more.  In
171.  See, e.g.,  15  U.S.C.  § 1261(s)  (1982)  (presenting a  non-exhaustive  list of ways in which  an
article may present  a mechanical hazard by creating an unreasonable  risk of injury).
172.  See,  e.g.,  42 U.S.C.  § 2000c-4(b)  (1994)  (allowing  the Secretary  of Education to  consider
"other"  relevant  factors  in  determining whether  to  make  grants  to  school  boards  for  desegregation
training).
173.  Besides the examples  cited at supra notes  170-172, the  former strategy appears in  15  U.S.C.
§ 2604(5)  (1982)  (manufacture of toxic substances);  the  latter arises  in  15  U.S.C.  § 2206 (1982)  (fire
prevention training); 21 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. 1995) (drug regulation); 42 U.S.C. §  300j(c) (1991)  (water
treatment);  42 U.S.C. § 502  (1991)  (social  security).
174.  Thus Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319  (1976),  leaves  this issue unresolved.
175.  With  a  formula,  the  factors  are  fully  identified  and  weighted  in  advance.  Consider,  for
example,  an effort to give precise  numerical ratings  for factors bearing on medical school  admission.
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the  area  of capital  sentencing, juries  and judges  look  to  a wide  range  of
variables relating to the offender and the offense.176  In voting rights cases,
courts  explore  many  aspects  of  the  context  in  order  to  test  for
discrimination.177
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to say that a system of factors
is attentive to all aspects of the situation.  There is no such thing as attention
to "all"  particulars.  Human  and  legal perception  are  inevitably  selective.
Even in  a discretionary  admissions program,  for example, the authority  is
not expected to care about an applicant's initials or foot size.  Similar  con-
straints are imposed in the context of capital sentencing. 17   The set of rele-
vant factors  is disciplined  by the context in which the assessment occurs.
These points  suggest that a system based on factors attends to much of
the whole situation, but certainly not to  all of it.  And because  decision by
factors entails attention to much of the whole  situation, and thus to a range
of particulars, it is familiar to see people arguing that their case is relevantly
different from those that have come before.  A litigant in case A can always
say that in some particular way, his case is relevantly different from case B.
5.  Attentiveness to Particulars;  Avoidance of Abstractions
In decisions by reference to factors, courts are highly attentive to par-
ticulars.  Their decisions do not necessarily govern other situations; they are
often said to be "fact-bound."  Abstractions  and broad principles are gener-
ally avoided.  They may be too broad, contentious,  sectarian, divisive,  and
confusing.  A  special fear  is that  abstractions  will be both over-inclusive
and under-inclusive.  A prime goal of decision by reference to factors  is the
avoidance  of error  through insufficiently  considered  rules  or principles-
insufficiently  considered  in  the  sense  of insufficiently  attuned to  the  full
range of particular cases.
179
6.  Attention to Precedent; Analogical Reasoning
Rules provide consistency; but a system based on factors  aspires to do
the same.  Such a system attempts  to ensure that all similarly situated peo-
ple are treated similarly.  A  must be treated the same as B, unless there is a
principled reason to treat the two  differently.
In a system of factors, the relevant consistency is sought through com-
parison with previous cases.  Suppose,  for example, that a trial-type hearing
has been required  before someone  may be  deprived of AFDC  benefits.1
8 0
The question then arises whether a similar hearing is required before some-
176.  See the system upheld in Gregg v. Georgia,  428  U.S.  153,  160-61  (1976).
177.  See, e.g.,  Rogers v. Lodge, 458  U.S.  613,  623-27 (1982).
178.  See Gregg, 428 U.S.  at  160-61.
179.  See supra text accompanying  note  9.
180.  See generally Goldberg v. Kelly,  397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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one may be deprived  of social security  disability benefits."8'  Perhaps this
case is  different  because  many  social  security recipients  are  not poor, or
because  disability determinations  do not turn heavily on issues of credibil-
ity.  Hence a fall trial-type hearing  is not required;  but the social security
recipient is entitled at least to some opportunity to counter the government's
claims  in  writing.'82  Then the  question  arises  what  kind  of  hearing  is
required before  a grade-school  student may be suspended  from  school for
misconduct.'8 3  Here the interest of the individual whose rights are at issue
seems  weaker  still,  and  here  the  government  can  invoke  the  distinctive
interest in avoiding undue formality in the  context of school-teacher  rela-
tions.'I 4  Through routes of this sort, a system based on factors can generate
a  complex  set  of  outcomes,  all  (ideally)  rationalized  with  each  other.
Analogical reasoning will therefore produce "local coherence,"  that is, con-
sistency within related areas  of the law.
7.  Diversely Valued Goods and Problems of  Incommensurability
Usually the factors at work in law are valued in qualitatively  different
ways.  Moreover, those factors cannot be placed on a single metric; they are
not commensurable.  To understand these  claims,  something must be said
about  diverse  kinds  of  valuation  and  about  the  difficult  problem  of
incommensurability.
a.  Diverse Valuations
It does  seem  clear that  human  beings  value  goods,  things,  relation-
ships, and states of affairs  in diverse ways;  all goodness is  goodness-of-a-
kind.'8 5  There is of course a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic
goods.  We  value some things purely  or principally for use; other things,
like  knowledge  or  friendship,  have  intrinsic  value.  But  the  distinction
between intrinsic and instrumental goods captures only a part of the picture.
Intrinsically valued things produce  a range of diverse responses.'8 6  Some
bring about wonder and awe.  Consider, for instance, a mountain or certain
artistic works.  Toward some people, we feel respect; toward  others, affec-
tion; toward  still others, love.  Negative valuations are similarly diverse:  to
lose money is to lose an instrumental good (though one that might be used
for  intrinsic  goods,  like  the preservation  of human  life),  while  to  lose  a
friend is an altogether different matter.  Our responses to intrinsic bads are
likewise  diverse.
181.  See generally Mathews  v. Eldridge,  424 U.S. 319 (1976).
182.  Id. at 345-46.
183.  See generally Goss  v. Lopez, 419  U.S.  565  (1975).
184.  See id. at 583.
185.  See ANDERSON,  supra note  15,  at 1-16; Arnartya  Sen, Plural Utility, in PROCEEDINGS  OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN  SocIr'  193,  194-202 (1980-81).
186.  See ANDERsoN, supra note  15,  at 8-16.
1995]CALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW
Many of the relevant  distinctions between  intrinsic  and  instrumental
goods, and among  intrinsic  goods themselves, play  a role in law, as when
beaches  must  be  compared  with  dollars,  or protection  of racial  equality
measured against economic  benefits  or associational  freedom.  It is  surely
possible  that the  use  of a  single metric,  treating  goods  as  relevantly  the
same, may have  some pragmatic  advantages;  cost-benefit analysis is based
on this judgment.'87  But decisions based on factors tend to involve  goods
that are understood to be valued in qualitatively diverse ways.
b.  The Relevant Factors to Be Assessed by the Legal System May Not
Be Commensurable
Now let us return to the idea that the Constitution requires deprivation
hearings when justified by  an  assessment  of three factors:  the individual
interest at stake;  the likelihood of error and the probable value of additional
safeguards; and the government's  interest, pecuniary and nonpecuniary,  in
avoiding complex  procedures.'88  It would be  odd to  say that this assess-
ment can be made through lining up the relevant variables along any single
metric.  If we  devise  a  scale,  we will have  to  recharacterize  the relevant
goods  in a way that changes  their character  and  effaces  qualitative differ-
ences.  Perhaps this is justified for pragmatic reasons, but something will be
lost as well  as gained.
As I understand the notion here,  incommensurability  occurs when the
relevant goods cannot be  aligned along a single metric  without doing vio-
lence to our considered judgments  about how these goods are best charac-
terized.' 89  By our considered judgments, I mean our reflective  assessments
of how  certain  relationships  and  events  should be  understood,  evaluated,
and experienced.  The notion of a single metric should be understood  quite
literally.  By this I mean a standard of valuation that (1) operates at a work-
able level  of specificity,  (2)  fails  to make  qualitative  distinctions,  and  (3)
allows  comparison along the same dimension.  In deciding cases  according
to factors, there is  often no such  metric.  Decisions nonetheless  are  made,
and they  can be justified  or criticized  on the  basis of reasons.  But  those
reasons do not amount to a single scale of value.  Of course, rules  are also
often  developed  on the basis of an assessment of incommensurable  goods.
These  are  brisk and  inadequate  remarks  about  a complex  subject.' 90
For the moment my claim is simple:  The factors that are typically at stake
187.  The Mathews v. Eldridge  standard is understood as a form of cost-benefit analysis in RICHARD
A. PosNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYsIS  OF  LAW  550 (4th  ed.  1992) and  in Jerry L. Mashaw,  The Supreme
Court's  Due Process Calculus  for Administrative  Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:  Three Factors
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.  CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
188.  Mathews  v. Eldridge,  424 U.S.  319,  335 (1976).
189.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MIcH.  L. Rav. 779, 795-
96 (1994).
190.  See  id. at 795-812  for a  more detailed discussion.
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in law are valued in different ways, and these factors are not generally com-
mensurable  along any scale.
IX
CHOICES
All this leaves two principal questions.  Under what circumstances  is it
appropriate  to rely on rulelessness  rather than rules?  And under what cir-
cumstances  might a legal system be expected to use one scheme rather than
the other?
A.  Positive and Normative
It  is unlikely that we will be able  to generate  a reliable  and general
positive theory on these topics.  Legislation is a complex product of legisla-
tive  self-interest, private  influence,  and public-spirited  motivations  on the
part  of both  legislators  and  those  who  influence  them.  Judicial  choices
between rules and rulelessness  are at least equally difficult to attribute to a
single behavioral  influence  or  set  of behavioral  influences.  It is  hard to
imagine  a simple testable  hypothesis that would  not be falsified by many
results in the world.
We  are  likely to  do  far  better by identifying  mechanisms  by which
certain choices might be made, rather than by identifying law-like  general-
izations by which  choices  are usually made."'  Moreover, the occasional
role  of public  spirit  in  legislative  deliberations-from  legislators  them-
selves or from people who  influence them-means  that the normative and
the positive cannot be so sharply separated.  Normative  views  about what
makes  best sense  will affect  outcomes.  The  same is  true of others  faced
with  the  choice  between  rules  and  rulelessness,  including  judges  and
bureaucrats.
It is still possible to offer some rough-and-ready generalizations.  Most
broadly, rules will likely be avoided (1) when the lawmaker lacks informa-
tion  and  expertise, so that the information  costs  are  too  high to produce
rules; (2) when it is difficult to decide on rules because of political disagree-
ment within the relevant  institution,  so that the political costs of rules are
too high to justify them;  (3)  when people in the position to decide whether
to have rules do not fear the bias, interest, or corruption of those who decide
cases;  (4) when those who make the law do not disagree much with those
who  will  interpret the law,  and hence  when  the law-makers  do  not need
rules to discipline administrators, judges, or others; and (5)  when the appli-
cations of the legal provision are few in number or relevantly different from
one another.  It follows  that rules will be chosen when the error rate with
191.  See JON Eisram, Nurs Amo  BOLTS  FOR Tim  SocIAL ScIENcEs  3-10 (1989)  (making this claim
much more generally).
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the particular rules is relatively low, when the error rate for rulelessness  is
high,  and when the number of cases is large.
There  can of course be a considerable  ex ante investment in rulemak-
ing, at least in the nonobvious cases, and at least if we seek rules that have
some  degree  of accuracy.  On the  other  hand,  the absence  of rules  may
produce  significant  costs  at the  stage  when particular  decisions  are made.
An important  question  is  which people  bear  these  costs,  and  how  much
power they have to minimize them.  Consider, for example, the problems  of
deciding whether airline pilots over the age of sixty are still able to do their
jobs  competently.  Such  decisions  will be  time-consuming,  may  produce
unequal treatment,  and may  create  a considerable  level of error under  the
pressure of the moment (mistaken  stereotypes  about people  over  sixty, or
misplaced sympathy for older employees).  Such decisions may also impair
predictability  and thus  create  high  costs  for people  trying  to  order  their
affairs under law.
Where those who make the law are not the same as those who interpret
and  enforce  it,  there  will  be  complex  pressures.  On  the  one  hand,
lawmakers  may distrust the interpreters  and  enforcers,  and  may  therefore
impose rules.192  If everyone is aligned in interest, the costs of rulelessness
will  be  diminished,  since  lawmakers  need  not fear  that  interpreters  and
enforcers  will  have  agendas  of their  own.  On  the  other  hand,  a  split
between lawmaking  on the one hand and law-interpreting/law-enforcement
on the other can create some pressure to avoid rules.  Here is the key point:
When lawmaking is separate from law-interpretation  and  law-enforcement,
many of the costs of producing  clarity ex ante will be faced by lawmakers
themselves, whereas  many of the costs of producing clarity ex post will be
faced by others.  A lawmaking body that does not enforce  law can "trans-
fer" the costs of rulelessness to those who must enforce whatever provisions
have been enacted.  There  may be political  and other  advantages  in doing
this-though as we have  seen, there are  countervailing pressures too.
The odd  and perhaps  counterintuitive  result is that  a  system  of sepa-
rated powers imposes  at least some pressure toward avoiding rules.  A sys-
tem of unified  powers  does  not  impose  similar pressure,  since  in such  a
system people who refuse to make rules ex ante will face the costs of rule-
lessness  ex post.  The rise of administrative agencies  combining tradition-
ally separated powers'93  helps  counteract  the  difficulty.
As I have  said, the benefits  for lawmakers  of refusing to make  rules
may, in a system of separated powers, be  countered by other factors.  The
failure  to  make  rules  may be  punished  by  the interests that  fear the out-
comes  within another branch of government,  or it may fit poorly with the
192.  Examples  include  the  reaction  of Democratic  Congresses  to  Republican  Presidents  in  the
environmental  area.  See  Robert V.  Percival,  Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of
the Environmental Protection  Agency, 54  LAW  & CorrEMp.  PROBS.  127,  173-78  (1991).
193.  See JAMES  M.  LANDis,  THE ADMnISTRATVE  PROCESS  1-5  (1938).
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representatives'  own  political  commitments  or  electoral  self-interest.
Similar  considerations  apply  to a decentralized,  hierarchical  judiciary.  In
such a system, there will be some incentive  for the Supreme Court to avoid
making rules  and to transfer the costs  of rulelessness to others. 194  But the
incentive can be overcome  by other considerations.
B.  Notes on England and America
Some of these speculations  are borne out by comparing the legal sys-
tem in England with that in the United States.'95  In England,  lawmaking
and law-interpretation  are far  more  rule-bound than  in the United  States.
The Parliament is less likely to delegate discretionary authority to judges.196
For their part, English judges treat statutes as rules, interpreting them liter-
ally and sometimes  refusing to investigate whether the particular  applica-
tion  of the  rule  makes  sense  as  a  matter  of policy  or  principle.'97  In
contrast, in the United States, lawmaking often takes place in the process of
confrontation  with particular cases.' 98
How might this be explained?  Is it possible to say that one or the other
nation is  proceeding  more  sensibly?  Perhaps not; perhaps  the differences
are  attributable  to  contextual  differences.' 99  It  is  notable  that  laws  in
England are drafted by an Office of Parliamentary Counsel, a highly profes-
sional body that consists  of skilled authors  of laws.200  The Parliamentary
Counsel brings about a uniform style of drafting.  It is also closely attuned
to the interpretive methods of English judges, and the Counsel  drafts legis-
lation with close knowledge  of literalism and  of the prevailing  canons  of
construction.20'  The judges' practice is itself uniform and relatively simple.
In  a parliamentary  system,  the  government  and the  legislature  are  allied,
and the high degree of party control means that there is a level of homoge-
neity  in  England  at  the  lawmaking  stage.2°2  Moreover,  and  critically,
Parliament revisits statutes with some frequency, and it fixes mistakes that
are  shown as such when particular cases  arise.20 3
The situation in the United States is very different.  There is no central-
ized  drafting  body,  and  hence  no  uniformity  in  terminology,  and  little
professionalization.  In America, the drafters of legislation are multiple and
194.  See Scalia, supra note 2, at 1178-79 (arguing that in our federal judiciary, where the Supreme
Court hears so few of the total cases, a rule granting discretion has the effect of forcing the lower courts
to be the courts that "clos[e]  in on the law,"  as opposed to the Supreme Court).
195.  I draw in this section on the extremely illuminating discussion in ATIYAH  & SuMiraS, supra
note  105.
196.  Id. at 99-100.
197.  Id. at 100-02.
198.  Id. at 88-93.
199.  Id. at 35-41,  103-12.
200.  Id. at 315-16.
201.  Id. at 316-17.
202.  Id. at 299-306.
203.  Id. at 318.
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uncoordinated.2°4  The party system imposes less discipline, and the execu-
tive and  legislature are hardly aligned.20 5  Congress  appears only intermit-
tently aware of the judges'  interpretive practices, which are themselves not
easy  to describe in light  of the sheer  size of the federal judiciary  and  the
existence of sharp splits, on just this point, in the Supreme Court.  Congress
does overrule statutory decisions to which  it objects.20 6  But it is not in the
business  of responding  rapidly and  regularly  to  particular  cases  in which
literal  interpretations  misfire.  Hence both lawmaking  and law-interpreting
practice  are very different  from what they are in England.
This brief description of the two systems supports the contextual argu-
ments offered above.  There tends to be more disagreement in America than
in England at the lawmaking  stage.  In America, the quality of drafting ex
ante is lower, as is the possibility of legislative correction  ex post. None of
this suggests that England or America has the optimal level of rules in light
of its own institutional  characteristics.  None of this suggests that interpre-
tive practices  in the relevant  nations  are immune  from  challenge.  But  it
does suggest that the two legal systems are highly responsive to distinctive
contextual  features.
X
REFORM  STRATEGIES
How can a legal system minimize the problems posed by unreasonable
generality on the one hand and those of potentially abusive discretion on the
other?  The best approaches involve (a) a highly contextualized,  indeed cas-
uistical  inquiry into the likelihood  of error  and  abuse  with either rules  or
rulelessness,  and hence  an  "on balance"  judgment  about  risk;  (b)  a  large
space for legitimate rule revisions; and (c)  a presumption in favor of a par-
ticular kind of rule, that is, the privately adaptable  rule that allocates  initial
entitlements but does not specify outcomes.
A.  Bentham and  Acoustic Separation
Jeremy Bentham favored clear rules, laid down in advance and broadly
communicated.2"7  In at least some of his writings, he  also favored  adjudi-
cative flexibility, allowing judges to adapt rules to the complexities  of indi-
vidual  cases.20 8  Bentham  was  aware  that  rules  could  misfire  as  they
encountered particular controversies,  especially if we understand the notion
204.  Id. at 318-20.
205.  Id. at 306-15.
206.  See  WILLIAM  N.  EsrmDE, JR.,  DYNAMIc  STATUTORY  INTERPRETATION  151-54  (1994).  See
generally  William N. Eskridge, Jr.,  Overruling Supreme Court  Statutory Interpretation  Decisions, 101
YALE  L.J. 331  (1991).
207.  See PosTEmA, supra note  4, at 411-13.
208.  Id. at 409-10.
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of misfiring  in utilitarian terms.20 9  In courts  of law, Bentham  concluded,
the rules  should not be fully binding.210
This  suggests  a paradox:  How  could  someone  advocate  clear  rules
without  asking  judges  to  follow  them?  Bentham's  ingenious  answer
involved  the different audiences for law.  The public  should hear  general
rules; the judges should hear individual cases.211  This is the important idea
of  an  "acoustic  separation"  for  legal  terms,212  justified  on  utilitarian
grounds.  There is such a separation in many areas of law, including the law
relating to excuses for criminality,  and perhaps in tax law as well.213
Following  this  idea,  we  might  suggest  that  legislatures  should  lay
down  rigid  rules  for  the  public-"conduct  rules"--but  that  interpreters
should feel free to  ignore them in contexts where they produce  absurdity.
Officials might follow more flexible "decision rules" that deviate from con-
duct rules  and indeed  that work  as  standards.  In some  ways  this  is the
American legal practice.21 4  American judges do not create systematic devi-
ations between  conduct rules and decision rules; but they do  make excep-
tions to literal language in cases  of absurdity.  Of course it is important to
develop  subsidiary  principles  to  discipline  the  development  of decision
rules and the general  idea of "absurdity,"  and to give these ideas  concrete
application in the modem regulatory state.  Modem administrative agencies,
more than courts, might be entrusted with the job of adapting general rules
to particular circumstances.21S
There  are, however, two  large  difficulties with the Benthamite  strat-
egy.  The first  involves  the right to  democratic  publicity-more  particu-
larly, the right to know what the law is.  The Benthamite strategy  severely
compromises  that right.  The rule  of law-and  democratic values-would
be jeopardized  if people  are unaware  that the law  is not what the statute
books  say that it is.  Benthamite  approaches  are therefore unacceptable  to
the extent that utilitarian judgments  about acoustic  separation run into lib-
eral principles of publicity.216  In a similar vein we might think that it is an
insult to the moral autonomy of the citizenry to be told that the law is some-
thing  other  than what  it is  in  fact.  There  is  a  serious  problem  from the
standpoint of democratic citizenship, since members of the polity, given the
right  and  duty  to  decide  on the  content  of law,  will  by hypothesis  lack
knowledge  of what the law really is.  This  ignorance will  compromise the
process of democratic  assessment of law.
209.  Id.
210.  Id. at 418-21.
211.  See id. at 195-96.
212.  For an illuminating discussion of this concept, see  generally Dan-Cohen, supra note  16.
213.  See id. at 637-48.
214.  See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United  States,  143  U.S.  457, 458-59  (1892).
215.  I try to  support  this  view  in Cass  R.  Sunstein, Law and Administration After  Chevron,  90
CoLum. L. Rev. 2071  (1990).
216.  See  the discussion of publicity  in Jom  RAwLs, A  THEORY  OF JUSTICE  16  (1971).
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The second problem with the Benthamite strategy is that it fails to take
account  of the fact that general rules  can create bad private incentives as
compared  with more  contextualized approaches.  Consider, for example,  a
speed  limit that creates  improper incentives  in cases  in which speeding  is
necessary  to save (the optimal level of) life and limb, or an environmental
regulation that requires adoption of expensive technology in cases  in which
the  environmental  risks  are  trivial. 217  The  secrecy  of  the  Benthamite
approach-the  distinction between the law as it is publicly known and the
law as it operates in courts of law-will do nothing at all about the problem
of bad incentives from crude rules.  Indeed, publicizing the exceptions, and
telling everyone about the possibility of close judicial attention to the par-
ticulars of your case, may well be a good idea if we seek optimal incentives.
At least this would be so if people would not react to the presence of excep-
tions  by believing that they can  do  whatever they want and  that the rule
effectively does not exist  at all.
Too often, then, the Benthamite strategy is neither democratic nor effi-
cient.  But there is still a place for what might be thought to be a version of
it.  A legal system might sometimes provide that in exceptional  cases, inter-
preters should be permitted to change rules, by exploring whether their jus-
tifications  create  absurdity  or  injustice  in  particular  cases.218  We  might
even  see  a judicial  (or administrative)  power  of this  kind  as  part of the
interpretation  of rules,  not  as  an  authority  to  change  rules.  This  power
should  be publicly known-a fully  disclosed  aspect  of interpretation.  In
some contexts, of course, the possibility of changing rules, or of interpret-
ing them with close reference to whether they make sense in particular cir-
cumstances,  might be  too damaging  to the project of rule-following.  But
this judgment  cannot be  made in the  abstract.
B.  Legitimate Rule Revision
Many legal systems allow people to deviate  from rules  in certain  cir-
cumstances.  Indeed,  many  public  officials  have  at  least a  tacit power to
revise  the rules  when  rule-following  would  be  senseless.  Citizens  as  a
whole often have the  same power.219  Legitimate rule revisions make rules
"on  the books"  operate  differently from how they appear.  Moreover, rule
revisions can help promote the democratic character of the law, by allowing
constraints on the application of rules to cases where they no longer fit with
public  convictions.
The  class of legitimate  official revisions  is large;  it helps supplement
legislation  with a set of post-enactment, or extra-enactment,  constraints  on
217.  See Bruce A.  Ackerman & Richard  B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental  Law,  37 STAN.  L.
REv.  1333,  1335  (1985).
218.  See id. See generally SCHAumR,  supra note  37.
219.  I borrow extensively in this section from the excellent discussion  in MORTiMER  R.  KADISH  &
SANFoRD  H.  KADIsH,  DISCRETION  TO  Disoaa"  (1973).
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what government  may do.  Consider the fact that juries sometimes "nullify"'
outcomes  that the law, if interpreted in a rule-bound  way, seems  to man-
date. 2 °  The  practice  of jury nullification  is  widely understood  as  legiti-
mate,2 2'  so  long as  it does  not occur very  often.  There  is  a  democratic
justification  for the practice:  it allows a salutary public  check on rules,  or
applications  of rules, that produce unjust or irrational outcomes.
So,  too, police have a widely acknowledged  authority to revise rules,
by deciding which  crimes warrant  arrest, and criminal prosecutors  have  a
widely acknowledged authority to revise rules, by refusing to punish certain
rule  violations.  In  exercising  this  authority,  police  and prosecutors  may
legitimately depart from rules governing private  behavior.  Officials refuse
to punish conduct that, while violative  of rules  on the book, is not widely
perceived  as  deserving  criminal  punishment.  Prosecutions  are  rarely
brought for sodomy or adultery, in part because such behavior, even if con-
demned,  is no  longer so  deplored as to  call  for jail  sentences  or  criminal
fines.  We  might  also  understand judicial  "softening"  or "moderation"  of
rules-sometimes under the guise of interpretation uuu -as  an exercise of a
tacitly legitimated  authority to reject rules when they make no sense.
Of course, people might question these various exercises  of discretion
to  depart  from  rules.  If, for example,  the police refuse  to  stop  domestic
violence-because they think that spousal abuse  is acceptable  or that gov-
ernment  should not  intervene  in the  family-we  might respond  that  the
refusal is unacceptable,  because  it produces  injustice.  The judgments that
underlie rule revisions might properly be criticized as confused or unjust.  I
am  suggesting  only that when there is  no  such problem, the revisions,  if
democratically  grounded,  are  a  good response  to the problems  posed  by
rule-bound law.
Certainly the existence of enforcement  discretion raises doubts  about
certain understandings  of the rule  of law.3  If what I am saying  is right,
there will often be a gap between  law on the books  and law in the world,
and for good democratic  reasons.  We might conclude that officials  in cer-
tain social roles-jurors, prosecutors, police-should believe that rules are
generally binding, but that they have authority to depart from the rules  in
compelling  circumstances.  This  authority  has  democratic  foundations;  it
might promote  liberty as well.
Now let us turn to the situation of the citizen.  Ordinarily we think that
people must obey the law or face the consequences  of violating it.  If they
are conscientious objectors-consider as examples Martin Luther King, Jr.,
or  abortion  protestors-their  violation  of  the law  may  be  a  product  of
220.  Id. at 45-66.
221.  See id.;  Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy,
43  LAW  &  CoNTEMP.  PROBS.  51  (1980).
222.  See supra text accompanying  notes  101-118.
223.  See generally FULLER,  supra note 47.
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deeply felt moral judgments, or even heroic; but they must nonetheless  face
the consequences.  This picture  has  much  truth in it, but  it is  too simple.
Often citizens,  like officials,  are  authorized to  depart from the rules.
Consider, for example, the fact that citizens who object to the constitu-
tionality of a rule are permitted to violate the rule and seek a judicial judg-
ment  on the constitutional issue.  Since there is an  overlap between  moral
argument  and constitutional  argument, the power to test rules against con-
stitutional  standards  might  well be  seen  as  a power  to  ask that  rules  be
revised when they are  especially unjust.
Perhaps this power  should not be treated as a genuine power to revise
rules, since the Constitution is part of the rules of the American  legal sys-
tem.  But citizens have other powers  as well, and these powers  should cer-
tainly be understood  as a power to change  or to soften rules.  Consider the
fact that people  are  allowed to  depart from  the rules  in  cases  of "neces-
sity" ' 224  and  also  in  a  more  controversial  category  of cases,  in which  the
legal rule no longer claims public  support.
We  have  seen that if someone  violates a speed  limit law in order to
escape  from  a  terrorist,  a  criminal  conviction  is  highly  unlikely.  In  all
probability, the driver will be held to have acted out of necessity, or to have
created a "lesser  evil."  The same result will be reached if Jones trespasses
on  property  in  order  to  prevent  someone's  death,  or  if Smith  steals  a
weapon from a third party in order to prevent bodily harm to Young.22  Of
course,  citizens  are  not  permitted  to  decide  freely  and  for  themselves
whether compliance with a rule is justified in a particular case.  But in most
legal systems, a citizen will have a legally sufficient excuse for violating the
rule if the violation was necessary to  avert a greater harm,  and  the excuse
will exist whether or not any legal decision has previously recognized  it as
such.
The  other, more  controversial  category  of legally permissible  viola-
tions of law by citizens involves the old notion of desuetudo, which forbids
the invocation  of old, unenforced  rules to  ban  conduct  in  cases  in which
people have  come to  rely on nonenforcement. 226  The idea has  a powerful
democratic  dimension.  If a rule,  or  a particular  application  of a  rule,  is
founded on a social norm that no longer has much support, we might expect
it to be enforced  not at all,  or only on rare occasions.  The rule  therefore
will be a tool for harassment and not an ordinary law at all.  The rare occa-
sions of enforcement might well involve arbitrary or discriminatory factors,
resulting, for instance, from a police officer's  mood, or personal animus,  or
bias of some kind.  A prosecution  for fornication,  brought in  1995,  might
well have  such features.
224.  KADiSH  & KADISH, supra note 219,  at  120-27.
225.  Id.  I  am  grateful  to Michael  McConnell for helpful  discussion of this point.
226.  Id. at  128-30.
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Consider  in  this  regard  the  controversial  case  of  Griswold  v.
Connecticut,  227 involving a ban on the use of contraceptives  by a married
couple.  The ban was not enforced directly by prosecutors.  No such prose-
cution could have received public  support; it would have been an  outrage.
The principal function of the ban was to deter clinics from dispensing con-
traceptives to poor people.  The problem with the ban was not that it was
unsupported by old  traditions  but instead  that it had no  basis  in modem
convictions.  Few people believed that sex within marriage was  acceptable
only if engaged in for purposes of procreation, and those people  could not
possibly have commanded a legislative majority, or even made it possible
to bring many actual prosecutions  against married couples.
Instead of relying on an argument about a broad right of "privacy,"  the
Supreme Court should have invalidated the law on the narrower ground that
citizens need not comply with criminal statutes, or applications of criminal
statutes, that are unenforced and that find no support in anything like com-
mon  democratic  conviction.  A judgment of this kind would have had the
advantage of incomplete theorization:  it might have produced broader sup-
port for the decision among  a range of people, including those who reject
any "right of privacy" or who are uncertain about its foundations and limits.
Another  controversial  case,  Bowers  v.  Hardwick," 2  involving
Georgia's  ban  on  homosexual  sodomy,  might  well  be  understood  as  a
repeat  of Griswold.  The  ban  on homosexual  sodomy is  rarely  enforced
against consenting adults.  Prosecutors  simply do not initiate proceedings,
for prevailing  social  norms  would  not permit many prosecutions  of this
kind.  To be sure, citizens did not successfully seek repeal of the statute; but
the  statute's  nonenforcement  made  political  mobilization  most  unlikely.
The  simple fact of widespread nonenforcement  strongly  suggests that the
statute was  out of keeping  with prevailing norms.  Realistically  speaking,
the ban on consensual homosexual sodomy is instead a weapon with which
police  officers  and  others  can  harass  people  on  invidious  grounds.  The
existence  of an unenforced law, used for purposes of harassment, is objec-
tionable for that reason alone.  We can draw a general conclusion.  Citizens
have engaged in legitimate rule revision (or revision of application of rules)
when they  violate rules  that lack  support in popular  convictions-unless
those convictions are themselves  demonstrably unjust.
Griswold and Bowers involved rules that might be thought to be legiti-
mately disregarded.  The  same  argument would  apply to  all situations  in
which  rules  or  applications  of  otherwise  valid  criminal  statutes  have
entirely fallen out of popular favor.  In disregarding palpably outdated rules
227.  381  U.S. 479 (1965).
228.  478 U.S.  186 (1986).
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or palpably outdated applications of modem rules, citizens are participating
in a healthy and continuous process  of democratic  deliberation.229
It is not clear whether American law fully recognizes the citizen's right
to revise rules in this way; the doctrine of desuetudo has no clear place.  But
the dilemmas posed by rules  and rulelessness  might be less  severe  if citi-
zens, like  officials, were permitted to depart from rules in the  cases I have
described.  Through this route, we might well respond to Bentham's prob-
lem  in a way that avoids the dangers  of Bentham's  solution.
C.  Pragmatic  Judgments
Often  a legal system should make  the choice  between rules and rule-
lessness  on  the basis  of a  contextual  inquiry  into  the  aggregate  level  of
likely errors  and  abuses. 230  In this sense,  the choice  depends  not on  any
rule, but on a form of casuistry.  I have suggested that when judges or other
interpreters  are perceived to be  ignorant, corrupt,  or biased, or in any case
when they diverge  in their judgments  from the people  who make rules,  a
legal  system should and probably will proceed  with rules.231  Even a poor
fit, in the form of overinclusive  and underinclusive  rules,  can be tolerated
when individualized decisions would result in a similar level of inaccuracy.
We might favor ruleness  when there  is no  special reason to distrust those
who make  decisions.  So too, individualized  decisions are likely to be dis-
pensed with when it is possible to come  up with rules that fit well.
The choice between rules and rulelessness  might be seen as presenting
a principal-agent problem.  The legislature, as the principal, seeks to control
the decisions of its agents.  A problem with rules is that the agents might be
able to track the wishes of the principal better or best if they are free to take
account of individual circumstances.  Any rule might inadequately  capture
the legislature's  considered judgments about particular cases.  The costs  of
rulelessness  might be acceptable  if the legislature does not believe that the
court or other interpreter is untrustworthy, perhaps because there is a widely
shared view of the relevant  problems.
On the other hand, without rules the agent might become uncontrolla-
ble.  This is so especially in light of the fact that a system of factors usually
allows the agent to weigh each factor as he chooses.232  The result is that a
system  of rules might be  adopted  as the best way, overall,  to control  the
agent's  discretion,  at least if there  is a measure of distrust of some or all
agents.
229.  See Cass  R.  Sunstein, Political Deliberation and the Supreme Court, 84  CALIF.  L.  REv.-
(forthcoming  1996)  (defending Supreme  Court's  casuitical  approach to  affirmative  action as a  way of
refusing to foreclose options and to allow  democratic  debate.)
230.  See generally  Kaplow, supra note 24, for a discussion of the context-dependent nature of any
inquiry into the benefits  of rules and standards.
231.  See supra notes 70-76  and accompanying  text.
232.  See supra notes  157-190  and accompanying  text.
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Rules tend to be sensible-and to be adopted in the first place-when
social consensus  exists within the  lawmaking  body;233  risk-free  decisions
that make use of factors  or standards are more probable when there is disa-
greement.  It is not hard to  obtain a ban on racial discrimination when peo-
ple agree that this form of discrimination is illegitimate; it is much harder to
obtain a similar ban on discrimination against the handicapped, so standards
and  factors  are pervasive.234  Consider the fact that Congress  often  dele-
gates  discretionary  power to  an agency  when it is  unable to agree  on the
appropriate rule, because of social conflict, and therefore it tells the agency
to act  "reasonably."  Examples  include  the  areas  of broadcasting  regula-
tion235  and  occupational  safety  and  health.236  The  costs  of laying  down
rules are increased  in the face of disagreement  on their content.
Sometimes, too, it is impossible to come up with an adequate rule in a
multimember  body.  Often  participants  in  a  dispute  begin  discussion  by
attempting agreement on "principles" rather than concrete rules, as in diplo-
matic  controversies over the Middle East.237  So too people may be able to
agree on a set of relevant factors, or perhaps  on some particular  set of out-
comes, without being able to agree on a rule, or on the general reasons that
account for particular outcomes.23 8  Sometimes  people will  agree  on gen-
eral principles but disagree on particular cases.  Sometimes the opposite is
true.  When rules do not emerge from legislatures,  it may well be because it
is impossible to get agreement within a heterogeneous body.  Return here to
the fact that legislatures that delegate broad discretion  can internalize  large
benefits of rulelessness:  economizing on information costs and on the polit-
ical costs of specificity.  They can  simultaneously  externalize the costs  of
rulelessness,  which will then be faced by administrators.  It is administra-
tors who must compile relevant information  and face the political  heat of
making  hard  and  specific choices.
It follows that we are likely to find rules when one group of interests is
well-organized  or otherwise powerful, and when its adversaries are not.  In
circumstances of this sort, the well-organized interests can press the govern-
mental body in the direction of rules.  A well-organized  group is unlikely to
allow itself to become  at risk through rulelessness  when it need not do  so
(unless it believes  that it is even more likely to be successful  with discre-
tion-wielding bureaucrats  or judges).  Consider laws governing the regula-
233.  See Peter H. Aranson et al., A  Theory of  Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. Rnv. 1,  24-27
(1982).
234.  See Americans  With Disabilities Act  of 1990,  42 U.S.C.  § 12112  (1995).
235.  See Communications  Act of 1934,  47 U.S.C.  § 303(r) (1991).
236.  See the open-ended  standards of the Occupational  Safety and Health Act of  1970, 29 U.S.C
§ 652(8),  as  construed in International Union v. OSHA,  938  F.2d  1310,  1316-17  (D.C. Cir.  1991).
237.  See  Patrick  Laurence,  Negotiation Seen  As  Only  Way  Out of South  African  Impasse,
CmsTiAN  Sci.  MoNrroR,  July  26,  1985; Michael  Parks,  Israel and PLO Pave the  Way for a  Wider
Peace,  L.A.  TIMES,  July  8,  1994, at Al.
238.  See generally Sunstein,  Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 57.
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tion of  agriculture,  which  are  often  highly  specific,  in  part  because  the
farmers'  lobby  is  well-organized,  while  the opponents  of such  laws  are
not.
23 9
Factors or standards  are more likely to be the basis for decision when
opposing  interests have roughly  equivalent power in the lawmaking body,
and when they are equally willing to take their chances with a bureaucracy
or a judge.24°  This may be  so because they are both highly organized,  or
because they are both weak and diffuse.  A possible example is the Occupa-
tional  Safety  and Health  Act, which is quite  vague,24  in part because  its
opponents  and  adversaries  are both powerful.
On the  other hand,  two  well-organized  groups  might produce  a  rule
when  compromise  is possible and when  there are,  to both groups,  special
risks in relying on an agency or a court.  This may be the case, for example,
when the regulated  class needs to know what the rule is, so it can plan its
affairs.  Perhaps it is  better  to  have fairly bad  rules  than  no rules  at  all.
When planning  is made possible by clear rules, members  of the regulated
class may have it within their power to avoid (some of) the costs of inaccu-
rate rules.  Informed  of the content of the rule, class members  can  adjust
their conduct  so as to avoid violating the rule in cases  in which the rule  is
overinclusive.  On the other hand, this avoidance may itself be  an undesir-
able  social  cost.  Return  to  the  problem  of  site-level  unreasonableness,
where application of an overbroad rule forces employers to make workplace
changes  that produce possibly little gain, and at possibly high cost.242
Rules are also more likely to be unacceptable  when the costs of error
in particular  cases  are very high.  The enormous danger of error can make
overinclusive and underinclusive  rules intolerable.  It is one thing to have a
flat rule  that people under the  age of sixteen cannot drive:  the social  and
economic  costs of mistaken  denials  of a  license  are  relatively low.  It is
quite another thing to have a flat rule that people  falling in a certain  class
will be put to death.  It is for this reason that rule-bound  decisions are unac-
ceptable in inflicting capital punishment,243  and to some  extent in criminal
sentencing generally.2"  (But here we must believe not only that rules make
for error, but also  that case-by-case  decisions will make  for less  error.)
This point also helps to explain the dramatic  difference between crimi-
nal liability, which is generally rule-bound, and criminal sentencing, which
239.  See 7 U.S.C.  §§ 601-674  (1980  & Supp.  1995).
240.  See  William  N.  Eskridge,  Jr.,  Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theoryfor Statutory  Interpretation,  74 VA. L. REv. 275,288-95 (1988).  See generally  THE POLrTcs OF
REGULATION (James Q.  Wilson ed., 1978); Michael  T. Hayes, The Semi-Sovereign Pressure  Groups, 40
J. PoL.  134 (1978).
241.  See supra note 236 and accompanying  text.
242.  See supra notes  137-141  and accompanying  text.
243.  Id.
244.  See generally  UNITED  STATES SErEN  c  G COamssIoN, supra note 36 What is important for
present purposes is that these are guidelines  and not rules.  See supra notes  36-44 and accompanying
text.
1014 [Vol.  83:953PROBLEMS WITH RULES
is  generally  less  so.  Part  of the story  is that  specificity  is  needed  at the
liability stage, so  that people can plan accordingly, and so that the discre-
tion of the police is sharply cabined.  Both interests are weaker  at the sen-
tencing  stage.  Planning is not  so  insistently at stake.  Errors  in degree  of
punishment are less objectionable than errors in subjecting an innocent per-
son to punishment.  The discretion of the  sentencing judge or jury is  also
less prone  to  abuse  than the discretion  of the police  officer, because  the
former, generally speaking, are less likely to decide on the basis of arbitrary
or irrelevant factors.
I have noted that rules are less acceptable in the face of sharp limits in
information  and  experience.  When  information  is  lacking,  or  can  be
obtained  only at  high cost,  officials  will  avoid  rules.  At the  same  time,
rules-once they are in place-economize  on information costs at the point
of application.  For example, there was a dramatic shift from adjudication to
rulemaking  in American  administrative  agencies  in the  1960s  and  1970s,
partly on the theory that rules  could resolve many  cases  at once,  and limit
the  informational  costs,  biases,  and  errors  of case-by-case  judgments.245
But because  of the informational  demands  imposed  on those  who  make
rules in the first instance,  rules are now exceptionally  difficult to promul-
gate, and there has been a shift in the other direction, toward  decision with-
out rules.  In the Environmental  Protection Agency,  for example,  it takes
over  a year  and  a  half to prepare  a rule  internally;  half  a year  more  to
receive the legally-required public  comments; and sixteen more months to
analyze the comments  and issue the rules. 246  It is not at all surprising that
the result is to shift agencies  away from rulemaking and toward less costly
options. 47
Rules are  also less  acceptable  when circumstances  are  changing rap-
idly.  When circumstances  are  changing, rules  are likely to be inaccurate.
Consider,  for example,  a congressional  decision  to issue a  statutory  stan-
dard  for permissible  emissions  levels  for coal-fired  power plants.  Surely
any such standard will soon be out of date because of technological change.
In these  circumstances  it may be best to enact privately adaptable rules, 248
to  delegate decisions  to institutions  capable of changing them  rapidly,  or
perhaps to allow case-by-case  judgments based on relevant  factors.
When numerous decisions of the same general class must be made, the
inaccurate  fit of a rule becomes far more tolerable.249  Consider, for exam-
ple, the requirement that all drivers must be over the age of sixteen, or the
245.  See STEPHm  G. BREYER  & RicHARD  B. STEwART,  ADMINIsTRATv  LAW AND  REGULATORY
POLICy  555  (3d ed.  1992).
246.  See id. at 107.
247.  See, e.g.,  Jerry L. Mashaw  &  David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration:  Legal Determinants of  Bureaucratic  Organization  and Performance, 57 U. Cm. L. REv.
443  (1990).
248.  See infra notes 252-257 and accompanying text.
249.  See Kaplow, supra note 24, at 563.
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use  of  the  social  security  grid  to  decide  disability  claims.  Infuriating
bureaucratic  insistence on "the technicalities"  may result simply because so
many  decisions  must  be  made,  and  because  individualized  inquiry  into
whether the technicalities  make  sense in each case  is too time-consuming.
Similarly,  rules  can be  avoided  when few decisions  need to  be made,  or
when each case effectively  stands on its own.
We  should  conclude  that  the  choice  between  rules  and  rulelessness
cannot be  made  on the basis  of rules.  That choice  is  itself a function  of
factors.  It would be obtuse to say that one or another usually makes sense,
or is justified  in most  settings.  To decide between  rules and  rulelessness,
we need to know a great deal about the context-the likelihood of bias, the
extent of current  information,  the location  and  nature of social  disagree-
ment, the  stakes,  the risk of over-inclusiveness,  the quality  of those  who
apply the law, the alignment or nonalignment of views between lawmakers
and  others, the  sheer number of cases.  It follows  that  a well-functioning
legal system should be suspicious of two trends in recent writing-extrava-
gant  enthusiasm  for  rules250  and  excessive  focus  on  the  possibility  of
achieving  accurate  outcomes  through  fine-grained  encounters  with
particulars.251
D.  Privately  Adaptable Rules
An ambitious strategy might emerge from distinguishing between two
sorts of rules, or, more accurately, between rules having and lacking a cer-
tain important  characteristic. 2 52  Some  rules allocate  initial  entitlements-
these unquestionably  count as rules-but at the  same time  maximize  indi-
vidual flexibility and minimize the informational burden on government, by
allowing private adaptation to determine ultimate outcomes.  Consider, as a
defining example,  background  rules  in the law of contract,  which can  be
adapted by the parties as they choose.253 , A background rule states  a pre-
sumption:  it applies if the parties do not provide otherwise, but the parties
are  freely entitled  to alter it if they choose.
Other  examples  pervade  the  legal  system.  The  rules  of the road  are
unalterable in the sense that one cannot make green mean red or vice-versa,
or drive  on the  wrong side; but the rules  of the road allow large room for
private judgment and thus differ from specific commands.  By creating con-
ventions, these  rules  help facilitate  private  conduct  and permit  people  to
250.  See generally Scalia, supra note  2.
251.  See generally Frank I. Michelman, Foreward:  Traces of  Self-Government, 100 HAuv. L. Rv.
4 (1986);  Martha Minow, Foreward Justice Engendered, 101  HARv.  L. REv.  10  (1987).
252.  Related discussion  can be found in  HAYEK,  CoNsn'noN OF LIBERTY,  supra note  12, at 148-
61,  distinguishing between  "laws"  and  "commands."  This is a highly  illuminating  but also  confused
discussion;  I have drawn  on some of Hayek's ideas but tried to reduce the  level of confusion.
253.  An instructive discussion of these issues appears  in Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic Theory of  Default Rules,  99 YALE  L.J.  87 (1989).
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operate under mutually beneficial  arrangements.254  Perhaps the most basic
example can be  found in common law rules  allocating property rights  and
thus creating private property, or rules governing entry into agreements.  In
the  same  vein,  a promising  effort to  allow  private  adaptation  in current
health  and  safety  policy  involves  taxes  imposed  on polluting  sources. 2 5
The rules embodied in such taxes  are privately  adaptable in the sense  that
people subject to the tax can alter their conduct so as to eliminate the tax or
to reduce it; it is for them to decide just how to respond.  In the same vein it
has been suggested that if stabilizing  population is the goal, rigid limits on
family size  may be inferior,  as a policy tool,  to  more flexible,  incentive-
based strategies,  such as greater education and employment for women.256
All  of these  various provisions  might  be described  as privately adaptable
rules.
By contrast,  some laws do not merely  allocate  entitlements,  but also
minimize private flexibility by mandating particular end-states or outcomes.
Consider price  controls, or  specified technology  for new cars, or flat bans
on carcinogens  in the workplace.  Even if these  rules have some flexibility
at  the margin,  they  allow  little  scope  for  private  adaptation.  Rules  that
specify end-states are common in modem regulation, in the form of "com-
mand  and control"  regulation  that says  exactly what people  must  do  and
how they must do it.257
The  line  between  privately adaptable  rules  and  commands  is  one  of
degree rather  than  one of kind.  What I am describing  is  a  characteristic
present to  a greater  or  lesser degree  in some  rules,  not a crisply  defined
category of rules.  Even command-and-control regulation allows a degree of
private adaptation, in the sense that people are permitted to  go out of busi-
ness  or  to  change  their  line  of work  so  as  to escape  regulation  entirely.
Notably, all rules, including the most adaptable rules, allocate entitlements.
The allocation may well have an effect on people's preferences,  since peo-
ple tend  to prefer  things  that have been  initially  allocated  to  them;258  it
might also affect distributions and hence  end-states  as well.259
Indeed, it is  insufficiently  appreciated  that government  cannot avoid
the task of allocating  entitlements  and of doing so through rules.  Laissez-
faire is a chimera; what is familiarly described  as laissez-faire  is actually a
particular set of legal rules.  Our rights,  as we live them, do not come from
254.  See HAYEr,  CONSTrrTUoN  OF  LIBERTY, supra note  12,  at 157-58.
255.  See A.LEN  V. KIEEsE & CARtaLs  L. ScHuLTZE, POLLUTION,  PRICES,  AND  PUBLIC POLICY  69-
111 (1975);  ALLEN V.  KNEEE , EcoNoMcs  AND  Tm  ENVIRONMENT  260-63  (1977).
256.  See Amartya Sen, Population:  Delusion and Reality, 41 N.Y. Rv. OF  BooKs 62,  71  (1994).
257.  See, e.g.,  Ackerman & Stewart, supra note  217, at  1334-40.
258.  See RICHARD  H.  THALER,  QuAsi  RATIONAL  EcoNomics  143-44  (1991).
259.  Hence the Coase  theorem will sometimes  be wrong  insofar as  it predicts  the initial  alloca-
tion  of the  entitlement  will  not  affect  outcomes.  See  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Endogenous Preferences,
Environmental  Law, 22 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  217,  223-24 (1993).
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nature.  They depend on law.26°  The rules of private property and freedom
of contract are rules, and they are legal in character.  What I want to empha-
size here is  that these  rules  are  distinctive  in the  sense  that they allocate
initial  entitlements, allow private adaptation,  and do not specify end-states.
The claim on behalf of privately adaptable rules is not that laissez-faire
is a possibility for law.  It is instead that law can choose rules with  certain
characteristics-rules  that will reduce the risks of rules, by allowing private
adaptation and by harnessing market and private forces in such a way as to
minimize the ex ante informational  and political  burden  imposed  on gov-
ernment.  A  large  part of the ultimate project  of minimizing  the costs  of
rigid rules is to favor rules that specify and allocate initial entitlements,  and
to disfavor rules that specify  outcomes.  In some cases,  of course, private
adaptation  should not be allowed,  because of effects  on third parties, costs
of administration  and  monitoring,  lack  of information,  collective  action
problems,  or other factors. 61
A key feature of privately adaptable rules is their association with free
alienability of rights.  Ownership  rights are of course freely alienable,  and
in this way they respond well  to the fact that owners and prospective  pur-
chasers know how valuable the relevant rights are to them.  The informa-
tional burden on government is therefore minimized.  The surrounding rules
do not operate as personal orders.  To be sure, privately adaptable rules are
coercive.  The law of property is itself coercive insofar as it prevents non-
owners  from  claiming  what they would  otherwise  claim  and  doing what
they would otherwise do.262  The virtue  of privately adaptable  rules is not
that they  are  not coercive  and not that they  are  "natural";  it is  that they
reduce the costs of rule-making and harness private information and prefer-
ences 6 3 in the  service of outcomes  that  are  themselves  not  identified  ex
ante.
People who favor privately adaptable rules and who distrust rules that
specify  end-states  are  often  known  as  critics  of  the  modem  regulatory
state. 64  The distinction between the two sorts of rules might easily be har-
nessed  in the service of an argument  for private property,  freedom of con-
tract,  simple rules of tort law, and relatively little else.  The  same insights
might, however, be used on behalf of reform strategies that take the modem
260.  See  the  instructive  discussion  of how  cooperation  must  precede  competition  in  JULES  L.
CoLEMAN,  RISKS AND  WRONGS  60-62 (1992).  This was an important theme  in the New Deal  era.  For
general discussion,  see CASS R. SuNsTErN, THE  PARTIAL CoNsnrrtrioN 40-67 (1993).  Some important
qualifications  emerge from ROBERT  C.  ELLICKSON,  ORDER  WrrHotn'  LAW  156-66  (1991).
261.  A discussion of all this would take me well beyond the present topic.  See generally Anthony
T. Kronman, Paternalism  and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763  (1983);  Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Interference with Private  Preferences, 53 U. Cm.  L. REv.  1129  (1986).
262.  Cf  SEN,  INEQUALITY  REEXAMINED,  supra note  147.
263.  Subject  to the qualification  in supra text accompanying  note  258.
264.  See generally HAYEK,  CoNsTrrTmoN  oF  LIBERTY,  supra note  12;  EPSTEIN,  supra note  144.
Although Hayek would allow the state to go well beyond the common  law, he is sharply  critical of the
tendencies  of post-1945  regulators.
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state as an important  social  good.  Many  current regulatory rules are  dys-
functional  not because  they promote  the goals  of the modem  regulatory
state,  but because  they unnecessarily  specify  end-states.2 65  In  so  doing,
they produce  both injustice and  inefficiency, in the form of overinclusive-
ness and underinclusiveness,  replicating  all of the problems typically asso-
ciated with a refusal to make inquiries  at the point of application.
A prominent example of this kind of rule is command-and-control  reg-
ulation, pervasive in the law of environmental protection; this form of regu-
lation  has  produced  significant  problems  because  of the  pathologies  of
rules.266  It makes  no sense to say that all industries must adopt the same
control technology,  regardless  of the costs  and benefits  of adoption  in the
particular  case.267  Command-and-control  should generally be replaced by
more  flexible, incentive-based  strategies, which invoke privately adaptable
rules.  Such strategies could save a great deal of resources by reducing legal
rigidity.  Liberty  would be promoted as well.  Instead of saying what spe-
cific  technologies  companies  must use,  a  privately  adaptable  law  might
impose pollution taxes or fees, and then allow private judgments about the
best means  of achieving  social  goals.  The  government  might also  allow
companies  to buy and  sell pollution  licenses,  a  system that would  create
good incentives  for pollution  reduction  without imposing  on  government
the significant informational burden of specifying means of pollution reduc-
tion.  The  familiar economic  argument for incentives  is  a key  part of the
argument  for privately adaptable rules.268
Or consider the area of telecommunications,  an area that has for too
long been  burdened  by unduly rigid  rules.  For  much of its  history,  the
Federal  Communications  Commission  has  been  faced  with  the  task  of
deciding  how to allocate  licenses.269  In making  this decision, it has alter-
nated between rules  and factors.  In using factors, the FCC has referred to
local  ownership,  minority  ownership,  participation  by  owners  in  public
affairs, broadcast experience,  the adequacy of technical  facilities, the back-
ground  and qualifications  of staff, the  character  of owners,  and more.270
The problems with both rules and factors  are entirely predictable-inaccu-
265.  This is  a large  theme in recent  works on regulation.  See, e.g.,  Ackerman &  Stewart, supra
note  217;  CASS R. SuNSTEIN,  AFTER  aTm  RiGrrs REVOLurION  74-110  (1990); see also infra note 268
(additional  sources).
266.  See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 55,  at 95-124.  See generally Ackerman & Stewart, supra
note 217.
267.  It is important to consider the degree to which the legal system can compensate for mistakes in
rules by adjusting sanctions and providing subsidies.  See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 23,  at 270-78.
268.  See John P. Dwyer,  The Use of Market  Incentives in Controlling  Air Pollution: California s
Marketable Permits Program, 20  EcoLoGY  L.Q.  103  (1993);  DAVID  W.  PEaRcE  AND  R.  KERRY
TURNER,  ECONOMICS  op NA-uRAL  I.REsouRcEs  AN  THE  ENVIRoNmENT  102-09  (1990).  Of course, the
success of any such approach would depend heavily on accurate initial pricing of the pollution license.
On this  issue, see Pildes  & Sunstein, supra note  55, at  122-23.
269.  See  STEPHEN  BREYE,  REGULATION  AND  ITs RErom  71-95  (1982).
270.  Id. at 78-79.
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racy through  excessive rigidity on the one hand,  and discretionary,  ad hoc,
costly, potentially abusive judgments  on the  other. 71
What  alternatives  are  possible?  In  a  famous  early  article,  Ronald
Coase  argued  that  the  government  should  allocate  broadcasting  licenses
through a system of privately adaptable rules172-based  on property rights
and market transfers,  as property law does (for example)  for ownership  of
newspapers and automobiles.  In the recent past the FCC has experimented
with auctions, and the results have been outstanding.273  There is an obvious
objection to Coase's proposal.  Perhaps broadcasting licenses should not be
regarded  as ordinary property;  perhaps the criterion of private  willingness
to pay is an inadequate basis for awarding licenses.  This objection contains
an important point.274  Broadcasting  may promote  a range of "nonmarket"
values, captured in the aspiration  to promote education,  attention to public
affairs, diversity of view, and high-quality programming. 75  But this objec-
tion  is not  a justification  for  departing  from  privately  adaptable  rules  in
favor  of command-and-control  regulation.  Any non-market  values  might
be promoted by more flexible  means.  Thus the rules for auctions might be
designed so as to ensure auction credits for those applicants who promise to
promote nonmarket values. 2 76  This example  shows that privately adaptable
rules might well be used not to oppose regulatory goals, but instead to har-
ness market  forces  in the interest of those very goals.277
E.  Abolition
Sometimes  both  rules  and  factors  are  intolerable;  sometimes  market
forces cannot or should not be harnessed.  Having eliminated both rules and
factors,  the law might use a lottery instead  as a method of allocating costs
and benefits.278  (Of course the decision to hold a lottery is supported by a
rule.)  This is a possible solution to the problems posed by a military draft,
where rule-bound judgments seem too crude, and where rule-free judgments
are too obviously subject to  discrimination and caprice.  Lotteries  are used
271.  See id. at 71-95.
272.  See R.H.  Coase,  The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.  LAw  & EcoN.  1, 25-35
(1959).
273.  See generally  John McMillan,  Selling Spectrum Rights  8  J. Eco  N. PERSP.  145  (1994).
274.  I try to  support  this  view  in  CAss  R. SusTE  ,  DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  FREE
SPEECH  53-92 (1993).  See generally Sunstein, supra note  130.
275.  See ANDERsoN,  supra note  15, at 65-90; Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State:
The Role of Non-Commodity  Values, 92 YALE  L.J.  1537,  1580-81  (1983).
276.  This route has been taken by the  FCC.  See McMillan,  supra note  273,  at 157-59.
277.  I am dealing  here  with private  adaptability  within  contexts  that appear  not  to  involve  the
symbolic, educative,  or expressive  problems of (for example)  a  "discrimination  tax"  or a "license  to
discriminate."  For a discussion, see generally Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31  SAN  DiEGO
L.  REv.  133  (1994);  see  also  ANDERSON,  supra note  15,  at  190-216  (discussing  problems  with
commodification).
278.  See the discussion of lotteries as allocation  tools in JON ESRER,  SOLOMONIC JUDOEMENTs  36-
122 (1989).
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in many other areas as well.279  Of course lotteries have an arbitrariness  of
their own,  and for this reason, they may be an inferior approach. 80
Alternatively,  the legal system,  having found both rules and ruleless-
ness  inadequate,  might  abolish  the relevant  institution  or  practice  itself.
(The abolition must of course be accomplished by rule.)  Hence the narrow-
est and probably the best argument  for abolition of the death penalty takes
the following form.  Rules are unacceptable because they eliminate the pos-
sibility of adaptation of criminal sentencing to individual circumstances.281
Privately adaptable rules would make little sense in the context of criminal
punishment, with the possible and controversial  exception of plea bargain-
ing.  Rule-bound  death sentences are excessively impersonal.  But rule-free
systems,  including  those based  on  factors,  are  unacceptable  too, because
they  allow excessive  discretion  and create  a risk that irrelevant or illegiti-
mate considerations  will  enter the decision  to impose capital punishment.
When judgments  are to be made  about who is to live and who  is to die, a
high degree of accuracy is necessary, and errors based on confusion, varia-
ble judgments, bias, or venality are intolerable.  The problem is that human
institutions  cannot devise a system for making  capital  decisions  in a way
that sufficiently diminishes the risk of error.  Rule-bound systems create too
many errors;  so too with systems based on factors.
The strongest argument against the death penalty is not that the penalty
of death  is too brutal,  but that  it cannot be administered  in a sufficiently
accurate way.  Suppose it could be shown that through individualized  con-
sideration  in the form of factors, the rate of error  is high,  at  least in the
sense  that irrelevant  or invidious  factors  play  a large role  in the ultimate
decision of life or death.  Suppose that rules are the only way to eliminate
the role of such factors, but that rules are objectionable  in their own way,
because  they  do  not  allow  consideration  of possible  mitigating  factors.
Perhaps evidence to this effect would not be sufficient to convince skeptics
that the death penalty  is unacceptable.  But if it is  possible to persuade  a
sufficiently  broad  range  of people  of this  conclusion,  the  sources  of the
argument  lie in evidence of this sort.
CONCLUSION
A system committed to the rule of law is committed to limiting official
discretion,  but it is not committed  to the unrealistic goal  of making  every
decision  according to judgments fully  specified  in advance.  Nonetheless,
rules are an admirable device for obtaining agreement on the content of law,
and also  for reducing  discretion at the point  of application.  Often people
279.  Id.
280.  Of course,  any real-world  draft is likely to include some rules and standards as well.  Multiple
possible combinations  might be imagined.
281.  See Woodson  v. North Carolina,  428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976)  (opinion of Stewart,  Powell,
and Stevens,  JJ.).
1995] 1021CALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW
can agree on rules when they disagree about abstract and theoretical  issues;
they can agree that rules are binding, that rules are good, and that rules have
a certain identifiable meaning.  Frequently a lawmaker  adopts rules because
rules  narrow or  even eliminate  the range  of disagreement  and  uncertainty
faced by people attempting to follow or to interpret the law.  This step has
enormous  virtues  in terms  of promoting  predictability  and  planning  and
reducing both  costs  and risks of official  abuse.
Rules  are  sometimes  thought  to  be  associated  with  merely  formal
equality;  but the association  is misconceived.  Hayekian understandings  of
the rule of law-identifying  rules  with  free markets-introduce  into that
notion  further  ideas  that  should  be  distinguished  and  that  require  an
independent  defense.
Rule-skeptics  say  that rules  are not what  they appear to  be.  In  their
view,  full  ex ante specification  of outcomes  is  a  chimera.  The need  for
interpretation  during  encounters  with  concrete  cases  means  that  ex post
assessments  of some  sort  are  an  inescapable  part of law.  Casuistry  is  a
large part of rule-interpretation.  There is some important truth in this claim.
Almost  any judgment  about meaning  will partake  of ex post substantive
ideas  of a sort.  It is  almost inevitable  that some case  will  arise that will
confound the attempt to use rules to specify all outcomes in advance.  What
I  have  called  "the problem  of the  single  exception"  is  common  in  rule-
interpretation.
These  claims  are  chastening.  But they  should not be  read for  more
than they are worth.  Certainly they do not defeat the project of those who
are  enthusiastic  about  rules.  Usually  the  question  of meaning  is  easy.
Often ex ante specification  is possible for most cases, where shared under-
standings permit rule-following.
Rules have many goals, but as they operate  in law, they are often sim-
ple summaries  of good  decisions in individual cases.  In carrying  out this
task, they reduce costs, ease choice, limit the errors encountered  in particu-
lar  decisions,  produce  coordination,  and  make  it  unnecessary  to  debate
issues of value  and fact every time someone  does something having social
consequences.  Because  of their  ex ante  character,  rules  will  usually  be
overinclusive  and underinclusive  with reference to the arguments  that jus-
tify them.  They will  often be outrun  by changing  circumstances.  Usually
the crudeness of rules is tolerable, and most of the resulting inefficiency and
injustice  can be controlled through means  short of abandoning  rules.  But
sometimes  the crudeness  of rules  counts decisively against them.
Many  of the most difficult  issues in law involve  the choice between
rules  and  rulelessness  in  cases  in  which both  seem unacceptable-rules,
because  of their  crudeness  and  their  insensitivity  to particulars  that  con-
found them; rulelessness, because  of the likelihood of arbitrariness and dis-
crimination in application.  The Benthamite strategy calls  for ex ante rules
for the public  and  ex post case-by-case  particularism  for judges.  I have
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questioned  this  strategy  on  both  economic  and  democratic  grounds,  but
sometimes  flexible, contextual  interpretation  of rules,  adapting the general
to the particular,  can bring about something  like the best of both worlds.
More generally, privately adaptable rules are a promising effort to min-
imize the problems of excessive generality,  by opting for rules that allow
private  adjustment,  harness private  ordering,  and reduce the informational
costs imposed  on government.  Some  people who favor  such rules intend
their arguments to be a challenge to regulation and a basis for approval  of
unrestricted (though rule-governed)  "free"  markets."' 2  But privately adapt-
able  rules  may enjoy  an  important  rebirth  in  the context  of government
regulation-in the creation of rules that are designed to accomplish regula-
tory goals, but that do so by specifying initial entitlements rather than final
outcomes, and that harness market forces in the interest  of socially chosen
ends.
I have  also suggested that legitimate rule revisions are pervasive,  and
that the  choice  between  rules  and rulelessness  might well be  based  on  a
highly  pragmatic,  contextualized  inquiry  into  the  costs  of  the  two
approaches in the area at hand.  Thus understood, the choice would itself be
based on the practice of casuistry, in which judgments for or against rules
emerge not from rules, but from  careful  assessments  of particular  circum-
stances.  I have urged that casuistry may well be given democratic founda-
tions insofar as it places a premium on rights to participate and to receive a
response.2 83  Casuistry is hardly all there is to a well-functioning legal sys-
tem,  and it has  important  limitations.  But if what I  have argued  here  is
correct, a form of casuistry plays an important role in the interpretation  of
rules themselves, and it occupies  a distinguished and prominent place even
in a legal system committed to rule-bound justice and  the rule of law.
282.  See HAYEK,  ROAD TO  SERFDOM, supra note  12, at 69-76; see also EPsmw, supra note  144.
283.  If casuistry  is  truly  to  promote  democratic  values,  as  indicated  in  EDWARD  H.  Laxi,  AN
INTRODUCTION TO  LEGAL  REASONING  2-6  (1948),  a society must ensure that norms of participation and
responsiveness  are  actually and not just theoretically  reflected in relevant  institutions.
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APPENDIX:  SOME DisPuTEs  BETWEEN  RULES  AND  RULELESSNESS
RULE RULELESSNESS
Roe v.  Wade trimester  system2 8 4
Miranda rules
286
exclusionary rule for illegally
obtained  evidence
288
corporate transactions  involving
interested  director voidable on
demand290
"place of contracting"  rule under
First  Restatement of Conflict of
Laws
292
Social security  grid
2 94
Mandatory retirement  age296
Presumption that pre-termination
evidentiary  hearing is required298
Mandatory death penalty  for
certain offenses 300 (invalidated)
Casey "undue burden"  standard285
"voluntariness"  standard2 87
inevitable discovery exception  to
the warrant  requirement2 9
corporate  transactions  involving
interested  director voidable  when
,,unfair,, 29t
assessment of relevant factors
under Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws
2 93
Judgments before social  security
grid
295
Retirement  when incompetence  can
be demonstrated
297
Balancing test in determining  the
need for a hearing 99
Untrammeled jury discretion  over
imposition  of death penalty30'
284.  Roe  v. Wade, 410  U.S.  113,  163-64 (1973).
285.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey,  112 S. Ct. 2791,  2820 (1992)  (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter,  JJ.).
286.  Miranda  v. Arizona,  384 U.S.  436,  467-77  (1966).
287.  See  Brown v. Mississippi,  297  U.S. 278,  285 (1936).
288.  See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,  251  U.S.  385, 392  (1920).
289.  See Nix  v. Williams,  467 U.S.  431,  446  (1984).
290.  See  Wardell v. Railroad Co.,  103  U.S.  651,  658 (1880).
291.  See State ex. rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co.,  391  P.2d 979, 984 (Wash.  1964).
292.  REsrATEMENT  (Fn ST)  OF  CONFLICr  OF  LAWS  § 332  (1934).
293.  RESTATEMENT  (SEcoND)  OF Co  ..icr OF  LAWS  §§ 6,  145,  188 (1969).
294.  See 20  C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2,  tbl.  1 (1994).
295.  See MAsKIAw, supra note  136, at  114-16.
296.  As upheld, for example, in Massachusetts  Bd. of Retirement  v. Murgia, 427 U.S.  307, 316-17
(1976).
297.  See Age Discrimination  in Employment  Act (ADEA),  29  U.S.C.  § 623(0(1)  (1985).
298.  See Goldberg  v. Kelly, 397  U.S.  254, 264  (1970).
299.  See Mathews  v. Eldridge, 424  U.S.  319, 341-49  (1976).
300.  This practice was  invalidated in Woodson  v. North  Carolina, 428 U.S.  280, 303-05  (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.).
301.  Upheld  in  McGautha  v.  California,  402  U.S.  183,  207-08  (1971),  overruled by  Pitts  v.
Wainwright,  408 U.S.  941  (1972).
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Regulation  of speech justified  by
danger of "imminent  and lawless
action" 
302
No barrier under  Tenth
Amendment to congressional
authority under Commerce
Clause
304
"Per se" rule in antitrust
3 0 6
No contracts without
consideration 3 8
Absolute  protection of endangered
species
31°
Rule of deference  to  agency
interpretations  of ambiguous
statutes
3t 2
Caveat emptor
3 t 4
Contract  at will-employer  and
employee  may fire or quit as they
choose,  unless contract provides
otherwise
31 6
Balancing  risk against benefit" 3
Tenth Amendment barrier to
congressional  authority  under
Commerce  Clause  when
"traditional  governmental
functions"  are involved0 5
"Rule  of reason"  in antitrust30 7
Promissory estoppel when reliance
is reasonable
309
Consideration of loss of species  as
a relevant  factor3"
Deference to agency interpretations
when reasonable to defer313
Seller liable for "latent defects"3 5
Employer may not discharge  in
violation of public  policy317
302.  See Brandenburg v. Ohio,  395  U.S.  444, 447-49 (1969)  (per  curiam).  Brandenburg placed
strict limits on the "clear  and present danger" principle of speech  regulation first set out in Schenck  v.
United States, 249  U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
303.  See Dennis v. United States, 341  U.S. 494, 508-09 (1951).
304.  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit  Auth., 469 U.S.  528,  552  (1985).
305.  See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976),  overruled  by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,  469 U.S.  528  (1985).
306.  See NCAA v. Board  of Regents,  468 U.S. 85,  103-04  (1984).
307.  See Standard Oil Co. v. United  States, 221  U.S.  1, 60 (1911).
308.  See Dougherty  v. Salt,  125 N.E. 94, 95 (N.Y.  1919).
309.  See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684,  685  (D.C. Cir. 1948).
310.  See Tennessee  Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.  153,  173  (1978)  (interpreting  the Endangered
Species Act).
311.  See  §  1(b),  80  Stat.  926  (1966)  (precursor  to  Endangered  Species  Act).  The  Endangered
Species Act  is codified at  16  U.S.C.  §  1531  (1985  & Supp.  1995).
312.  See Chevron  USA,  Inc.  v. National  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  467  U.S.  837,  844
(1984).
313.  See, e.g., Baltimore  Gas & Elec.  Co. v. National Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  462 U.S.
87,  97-108  (1983)  (upholding  a  rule  adopted  by  the  Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  which  was
premised  on  a  conclusion  that  permanent  storage  of  nuclear  waste  would  have  no  significant
environmental  impact).
314.  See Barnard v. Kellogg,  77 U.S.  (10  Wall.) 383,  388  (1871).
315.  See Vandermark  v. Ford Motor  Co., 391  P.2d  168,  171-72  (Cal.  1964).
316.  See Payne v. Western & Atlantic  R.R., 81  Tenn. 507,  519-20  (1884).
317.  See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,  335 N.W.2d  834, 840 (Wis.  1983).
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Plain meaning approach to
statutory  interpretation 318
All  administrative/executive
authority  must be under the
President
3 20
Negligence  per Se 322
Inquiry into  legislative intentions 3t 9
Administrative/executive  authority
may be immunized  from President
if this does not intrude  on
President's core functions
321
Negligence  if conduct  is
unreasonable
323
318.  See Tennessee  Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437  U.S.  153,  173  (1978).
319.  See Citizens to Preserve  Overton  Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401  U.S.  402, 410-16  (1971).
320.  See  Myers v. United States,  272 U.S.  52, 117  (1926).
321.  See Morrison v. Olson,  487  U.S.  654, 693-97  (1988).
322.  See Osborne v. McMasters,  41 N.W. 543, 544 (Minn.  1889).
323.  See  ]RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TORTS  §§ 291,  292  (1965).
1026